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CRIMINALIZING RACE: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN PLEA-BARGAINING 
CARLOS BERDEJÓ* 
Abstract: Most of the empirical research examining racial disparities in the 
criminal justice process has focused on its two endpoints—the arrest and ini-
tial charging of defendants and judges’ sentencing decisions. Few studies have 
assessed disparities in the steps leading up to a defendant’s conviction, where 
various actors make choices that often constrain judges’ ultimate sentencing 
discretion. This Article addresses this gap by examining racial disparities in 
the plea-bargaining process, focusing on the period between the initial filing 
of charges and the defendant’s conviction. The results presented in this Article 
reveal significant racial disparities in this stage of the criminal justice process. 
White defendants are twenty-five percent more likely than black defendants to 
have their principal initial charge dropped or reduced to a lesser crime. As a 
result, white defendants who face initial felony charges are less likely than 
black defendants to be convicted of a felony. Similarly, white defendants ini-
tially charged with misdemeanors are more likely than black defendants either 
to be convicted for crimes carrying no possible incarceration, or not to be 
convicted at all. Racial disparities in plea-bargaining outcomes are greater in 
cases involving misdemeanors and low-level felonies. In cases involving se-
vere felonies, black and white defendants achieve similar outcomes. Defend-
ants’ criminal histories also play a key role in mediating racial disparities. Alt-
hough white defendants with no prior convictions receive charge reductions 
more often than black defendants with no prior convictions, white and black 
defendants with prior convictions are afforded similar treatment. These pat-
terns in racial disparities suggest that in these “low information” cases, race 
perhaps is being used as a proxy for a defendant’s latent criminality and like-
lihood to recidivate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of African Americans in the criminal justice process has 
been the subject of intense scrutiny in both academic literature and the pop-
ular press. Many have argued that policing practices disproportionately tar-
get black individuals,1 who are also more likely to be arrested and become 
defendants in criminal cases.2 These black defendants are incarcerated more 
often and sentenced to longer terms in prison relative to white defendants.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s 
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 
813–14 (2012) (finding that black individuals were stopped more frequently than white individu-
als even after controlling for a variety of factors); N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP AND FRISK 
REPORT 2011, at 7 (May 2012), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/NYCLU_
2011_Stop-and-Frisk_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/77W4-UERP] (finding that young minority 
males accounted for 41.6% of stops even though they comprise 4.7% of the population); GREG 
RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP., ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DE-
PARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 31 (2007), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
technical_reports/TR534.html [http://perma.cc/D4LJ-4NH8] (finding that black suspects are more 
likely to be frisked than similarly situated white suspects and that police arrested and used force 
against nonwhite suspects more than similarly situated white suspects). In 2013, a federal district 
court held that the New York City Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policy violated the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 
661 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 2 See, e.g., KAREN E. FIELDS & BARBARA J. FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF INEQUALITY 
IN AMERICAN LIFE 265 (2012) (“While Afro-Americans accounted for 14 percent of drug users in 
the United States in 2006, they accounted for 35 percent of those arrested for drug offenses, 53 
percent of those convicted, and 45 percent of those in prison for drug offenses as of 2004.”); Shi-
ma Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 187–90 (2013) 
(finding that police arrest black individuals more often for drug crimes than white individuals); 
Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons 
from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 426–29 (2005) (comparing drug use data with arrest statistics 
and finding disparities between the racial composition of arrestees and users); Christopher J. Ly-
ons & Becky Pettit, Compounded Disadvantage: Race, Incarceration, and Wage Growth, 58 SOC. 
PROBS. 257, 257–58 (2011) (noting that black drivers are about three times more likely to be 
searched during a traffic stop than white drivers and that black individuals are twice as likely to be 
arrested than white individuals); Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: ‘Staggering Dis-
parity,’ USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2014, 5:13 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates/19043207 [http://perma.cc/3CCZ-HXPJ] (examining data 
filed by police departments with the FBI and concluding that blacks are more likely than others to 
be arrested in almost every city regardless of the type of crime). 
 3 For a review of the existing literature on racial disparities in criminal sentencing see infra 
notes 35–45 and accompanying text. Racial disparities in the imposition of capital punishment are 
also well-documented. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETH-
NICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 231–45 (2000); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race 
Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA’S EXPER-
IMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE 
ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 501, 513–14 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003). For a recent 
study, see KATHERINE BECKETT & HEATHER EVANS, THE ROLE OF RACE IN WASHINGTON 
STATE CAPITAL SENTENCES, 1981–2012, at 2 (Jan. 2014), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
WashRaceStudy2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K4C6-5WMM] (finding juries were three times more 
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The end result of these disparities is a pair of dispiriting statistics that are 
well-known to many—black males are incarcerated at a rate that is five 
times that of white males,4 and one third of black males can expect to be 
imprisoned at some point in their lives.5 
Much of the recent empirical work on racial disparities in the criminal 
justice process has centered on its two endpoints—the arrest and initial 
charging of individuals and sentencing decisions by judges. These studies 
generally find that black individuals are more likely to be arrested and 
charged than white individuals6 and that black defendants receive harsher 
sentences than white defendants.7 The reasons for these observed disparities 
are the subject of vigorous academic debate.8 
Setting that debate aside, merely focusing on these endpoints ignores 
critical steps in the criminal justice process that follow an individual’s de-
tention but precede the sentencing hearing. Critically, judges make their 
sentencing decisions conditional on the crime (or crimes) for which the de-
fendant was convicted, which, together with other factors, determines a sen-
tencing range.9 The crime of ultimate conviction is the result of a process 
controlled by a different set of actors in the system.10 Surprisingly, few 
studies have examined the role of race in determining defendants’ outcomes 
in these pre-sentencing stages of the criminal justice process.11 
This Article fills this gap in the literature by examining disparities in 
the plea-bargaining process that precede judges’ sentencing decisions and 
constrain their sentencing discretion. Using data obtained from the Wiscon-
                                                                                                                           
likely to impose the death penalty when the defendant was black than in cases involving similarly 
situated white defendants). 
 4 See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (June 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-
justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons [http://perma.cc/SLW2-2CL7] (explaining “Afri-
can Americans are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate that is 5.1 times the imprisonment of 
whites”); Keith Humphreys, There’s Been a Big Decline in the Black Incarceration Rate, and Almost 
Nobody’s Paying Attention, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/02/10/almost-nobody-is-paying-attention-to-this-massive-change-in-criminal-justice 
[http://perma.cc/J33Z-A65X] (reporting that in 2014, 2,725 of every 100,000 black males were 
imprisoned, while for white males the corresponding figure was 465). 
 5 Lyons & Pettit, supra note 2, at 257–58 (citing data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics that 
suggest that “one in three black men can expect to go to prison in their lifetime”). 
 6 See supra notes 1–2; infra note 60 and accompanying text. Additionally, black defendants 
are less likely to be released on bail and more likely to be held in remand prior to trial. See infra 
notes 289–290 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 33–64 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 46, 82–90 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 48–51, 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
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sin Circuit Courts, this Article documents striking racial disparities in these 
earlier stages.12 White defendants are twenty-five percent more likely than 
black defendants to have their most serious initial charge dropped or re-
duced to a less severe charge (i.e., black defendants are more likely than 
white defendants to be convicted of their highest initial charge).13 As a re-
sult, white defendants who face initial felony charges are approximately 
fifteen percent more likely than black defendants to end up being convicted 
of a misdemeanor instead.14 In addition, white defendants initially charged 
with misdemeanors are approximately seventy-five percent more likely than 
black defendants to be convicted for crimes carrying no possible incarcera-
tion, or not to be convicted at all.15 
More in-depth analyses reveal two patterns that may shed light as to 
the underlying dynamics behind these racial disparities. First, disparities in 
plea-bargaining outcomes appear to be driven by cases in which defendants 
have no prior convictions.16 In cases involving defendants with prior con-
victions there are no significant racial disparities in plea-bargaining out-
comes.17 This pattern suggests that in the absence of evidence of a defend-
ant’s recidivism risk (for example, when there is no criminal history), pros-
ecutors may be using race as a proxy for the defendant’s likelihood to recid-
ivate.18 Second, racial disparities in plea-bargaining outcomes are greater in 
cases involving misdemeanors and low-level felonies relative to cases in-
volving more severe offenses.19 This second pattern suggests that prosecu-
tors may be using race as a proxy for a defendant’s latent criminality (for 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Not only do black defendants receive less favorable treatment in the plea-bargaining pro-
cess but, consistent with the existing literature in the field, this Article also finds that black de-
fendants encounter significant disparities at the sentencing stage as well. Black defendants are 
50% more likely than white defendants to be incarcerated and receive sentences that are on aver-
age two months longer than white defendants. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 187–190 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. Notably, sentencing disparities are also 
greater in the subset of misdemeanor cases. See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra note 198 and accompanying text. Although existing studies have controlled for 
the prior criminal history of defendants when examining racial disparities in criminal case out-
comes, these have not explored the interaction of this variable with the defendant’s race. See infra 
notes 70–101 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 675 (2015) (criticiz-
ing predictors of recidivism that use various defendant characteristics, including race, as illegal 
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause and incorrectly sever-
ing the causal connection between an individual’s conduct and the punishment they receive); infra 
notes 260–267 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 260–267 and accompanying text. 
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example, propensity to commit a severe offense in the future) in cases in-
volving low-level offenses.20 
In addition to uncovering racial disparities in the plea-bargaining pro-
cess, this Article contributes to a pair of current policy debates in the criminal 
law arena. First, the evidence presented in this Article sheds light on the ques-
tion surrounding the role that the disparate impact theory should play in equal 
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Historically, courts have 
been reluctant to accept statistical evidence showing patterns of racial dis-
crimination to establish an equal protection claim, instead requiring plaintiffs 
to show a racially discriminatory intent or purpose.21 Several scholars have 
been critical of the high burden placed on plaintiffs as a result of this re-
quirement, which often renders the equal protection clause an ineffectual tool 
for combating racial discrimination in the criminal justice process.22 Critics of 
this evidentiary standard argue that its focus on discriminatory purpose and 
intent ignores the growing evidence on the impact of implicit racial biases on 
an individual’s actions, which often contradict an individual’s conscious or 
express intentions.23 If subconscious racial biases do contribute to racial dis-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 262–267 and accompanying text. 
 21 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (holding that evidence of the 
unjustified racially disparate impact was insufficient to support an equal protection claim against a 
state’s capital punishment regime unless a defendant can prove disparate treatment was based on 
race in their individual case); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 228, 242 (1976) (holding that statis-
tical evidence of the unjustified racially disparate impact of an employment policy was insuffi-
cient to mount an equal protection challenge to the policy); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 
993 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs challenging a felon disenfranchisement law under the 
Voting Rights Act must “at least” show that a state’s criminal justice system is “infected by inten-
tional discrimination or that the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent”); see 
also Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of 
Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 695, 701–08 (2010). 
 22 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 135 (2010) (discussing Supreme Court precedent preventing challeng-
es to racial bias in the criminal justice system and arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court has now 
closed the courthouse doors to claims of racial bias at every stage of the criminal justice process, 
from stops and searches to plea bargaining and sentencing”); Baradaran, supra note 2, at 174 
(“The standard of racial intent proves difficult to establish and allows relatively unchecked police 
discretion. . . . As a whole, at all steps in the process—stops, searches, plea bargaining, charging, 
and sentencing—the Court has made it much more difficult to bring claims of racial bias, resulting 
in unchecked discretion by criminal justice actors.”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism 
and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1031 (1988) (“The dissatisfaction with the 
discriminatory purpose doctrine has several facets, but a recurring theme in the literature is the 
difficulty of proving discriminatory purpose.”); David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to 
Reform Racially Biased Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 106 (2007) 
(arguing “the Equal Protection Clause requires a showing of intentional racial discrimination be-
fore a court may consider legal remedies”). 
 23 See John Tyler Clemons, Blind Injustice: The Supreme Court, Implicit Racial Bias, and the 
Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 689, 692–94 (2014) 
(summarizing existing research on implicit racial bias and the perception of criminality based on 
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parities (for example, by the use of race as a proxy for a defendant’s latent 
criminality),24 there would be no constitutional means to address these under 
the evidentiary requirements articulated by the courts.25 The nature of the 
biases documented in this Article affirms the need to re-examine the role of 
evidence showing disparate impact in equal protection claims. 
The evidence presented in this Article also touches upon a second cur-
rent policy debate—the treatment of misdemeanors in the criminal justice 
process and their role in perpetuating racial disparities. Unlike other studies 
that have focused on more serious felony crimes, this Article stresses the 
importance of racial disparities in misdemeanor cases, both in plea-
bargaining and sentencing.26 Although misdemeanors have traditionally 
been overlooked due to the low-level nature of the offenses, sheer volume 
of cases, and the shorter sentences involved, recent work has highlighted 
their significant role in the criminalization of black males.27 The fact that 
the racial disparities in plea-bargaining and sentencing documented in this 
Article are greater in cases involving misdemeanors adds further urgency to 
the debate surrounding their regulation and decriminalization.28 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the existing evi-
dence on racial disparities in criminal case outcomes, highlighting the lim-
ited attention that has been devoted to the plea-bargaining process.29 Part II 
provides background information on the criminal justice process in Wiscon-
sin and describes the dataset and the construction of the variables used in 
the analyses.30 The results of these analyses are then presented in Part III.31 
                                                                                                                           
an individual’s race); Johnson, supra note 22, at 1027–28 (explaining “[a] burgeoning literature 
documents the rise of the ‘aversive’ racist, a person whose ambivalent racial attitudes leads him or 
her to deny his or her prejudice and express it indirectly, covertly, and often unconsciously”); 
Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101, 102 (2000) (ex-
plaining how individuals can harbor implicit biases distinct from their explicit attitudes); see also 
infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 44–45, 54–57 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Incarceration of African Americans: What Histo-
ry and the First Decade of Twenty-First Century Have Brought, 11 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 
87, 104 (2011) (“Each decision point of the criminal justice system: arrest by law enforcement; 
arraignment, release, and pre-adjudicatory hearings; pre-trial jail and prison custody; adjudication 
and sentencing; probation and community supervision; and parole decisions are all exercised with 
various levels of discretion and subject to covert, overt, and unconscious biases.”); Johnson, supra 
note 22, at 1019 (“The phenomenon of unconscious racism challenges both Powell’s fourteenth 
and his eighth amendment analyses. The concept of purposeful discrimination, or at least its ter-
minology, does not mesh well with unconscious race discrimination.”). 
 26 See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 177–186, 262–267 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 183–186 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 33–64 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 65–116 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 117–276 and accompanying text. 
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The policy implications of these results and avenues for future research are 
discussed in the Conclusion.32 
I. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL CASE OUTCOMES 
This Part discusses the existing empirical and theoretical work examin-
ing racial disparities in the criminal justice process. Section A begins with 
an overview of the empirical literature that has identified significant racial 
disparities in the imprisonment of white and black defendants, followed by 
a review of the theoretical work that has attempted to explain these dispari-
ties.33 Section B describes the critical role of prosecutorial discretion and 
the plea-bargaining process in determining criminal case outcomes, high-
lighting the limited attention that has been devoted in the empirical litera-
ture to this particular area.34 
A. Racial Disparities in Sentencing 
Studies examining criminal case outcomes in federal courts have 
identified substantial racial disparities in judges’ sentencing decisions—
black defendants are incarcerated more frequently and receive longer 
sentences than white defendants.35 Although fewer studies have analyzed 
sentencing disparities at the state level, the evidence suggests that racial 
disparities in sentencing outcomes also exist at the state level.36 
Various factors can explain these racial disparities. For example, the 
severity of the conviction offense and the defendant’s criminal history are 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 277–303 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 35–45 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 46–64 and accompanying text. 
 35 See, e.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evi-
dence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 306 (2001) (finding that black and 
Hispanic defendants receive substantially longer sentences than white defendants and are also 
more likely to be incarcerated); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentenc-
es: The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 72–73 (2005) 
(finding that black defendants in federal criminal cases receive sentences that are 2.9 months 
higher than white defendants, a difference that represents 6% of the average sentence of 48.2 
months); Darrel Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. 
Federal Courts: Who Is Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705, 716 (2000) [hereinafter 
Steffensmeier & Demuth, Outcomes] (documenting similar sentencing disparities). 
 36 See, e.g., David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 347, 356 (2012) (finding that black defendants in Chicago, Illinois receive longer 
sentences and are 30% more likely to be incarcerated than white defendants); Darrel Steffensmeier 
& Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’ Sentencing Decisions: Hispanic-Black-White Compari-
sons, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 160 (2001) [hereinafter Steffensmeier & Demuth, Decisions] (find-
ing that white defendants in Pennsylvania are less likely to be incarcerated than black and Hispan-
ic defendants, and also receive shorter sentences). 
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associated with higher rates of incarceration and longer prison sentences.37 
Thus, if black defendants have lengthier prior records and are convicted of 
offenses that are more severe than white defendants, then one would expect 
the former to receive, on average, longer sentences.38 Other defendant char-
acteristics, such as age39 and gender,40 which impact sentencing determina-
tions could also be correlated with a defendant’s race. Nevertheless, even 
after controlling for these defendant and crime characteristics, a significant 
black-white sentencing gap remains.41 
Another explanation for the observed racial disparities in sentencing is 
that judges, due to time and information constraints, may be using a defend-
ant’s race (an observable attribute) as a proxy for the defendant’s inherent 
criminality (an unobservable attribute).42 Judges must make their sentencing 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Mustard, supra note 35, at 306; Steffensmeier & Demuth, Decisions, supra note 36, at 
161. 
 38 See Steffensmeier & Demuth, Outcomes, supra note 35, at 716 (finding that black defend-
ants are convicted of more severe offenses and have lengthier prior records than white defend-
ants). 
 39 Existing work suggests that younger defendants receive harsher punishment than older 
defendants. See, e.g., Mustard, supra note 35, at 309 (finding that younger defendants receive on 
average higher sentences); Steffensmeier & Demuth, Decisions, supra note 36, at 161 (finding that 
older defendants are less likely to be incarcerated and receive longer sentences than younger de-
fendants). 
 40 Prior studies have found that female defendants receive on average shorter sentences than 
their male counterparts. See, e.g., Mustard, supra note 35, at 306 (finding that female defendants 
are more likely to be assigned no prison term than male defendants); Schanzenbach, supra note 
35, at 84 (finding that female defendants on average receive sentences that are 5.4 months lower 
than those received by males in federal criminal cases); Darrel Steffensmeier et al., Gender and 
Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 423 (1993) (finding that male defendants are 
more likely to be incarcerated and receive lengthier sentences than female defendants in criminal 
cases in Pennsylvania). 
 41 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. Unobservable crime characteristics may 
also be driving these sentencing disparities. The heinousness and other aspects of a crime, which 
may be observed by a judge but not a researcher, may affect sentencing decisions. See Schanzen-
bach, supra note 35, at 63. However, for this to explain racial disparities in sentencing, one would 
need the heinousness of a crime to correlate with the race of the criminal (i.e., black criminals 
would need to be more likely to commit a given crime in a more heinous manner than white crim-
inals). 
 42 See Celesta A. Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial Discretion, 38 
SOC. PROBS. 247, 250 (1991) [hereinafter Albonetti, Integration] (“Using defendant characteris-
tics, circumstances of the crime, and case processing outcomes, judges assess the defendant’s 
disposition toward future criminal activity. . . . Discrimination and disparity in sentencing deci-
sions . . . may be the product of judicial attempts to achieve a ‘bounded rationality’ in sentencing 
by relying on stereotypical images of which defendant is most likely to recidivate.”); Celesta A. 
Albonetti, The Joint Conditioning Effect of Defendant’s Gender and Ethnicity on Length of Im-
prisonment Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Drug Trafficking/Manufacturing Of-
fenders, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 39, 42 (2002) (“From the uncertainty avoidance/causal at-
tribution perspective, the defendant’s gender and ethnicity are salient to attributions of an enduring 
predisposition to criminal activity and dangerousness. As such, these defendant characteristics 
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decision without full knowledge of the defendant’s likelihood of recidivat-
ing and the danger that the defendant represents to the community, factors 
that arguably help determine the optimal sentence in a criminal case.43 In 
this setting, implicit biases can lead judges to make decisions that systemat-
ically discriminate against defendants of a given race if they ascribe certain 
characteristics to members of that group.44 If judges perceive black defend-
ants as being more dangerous and more likely to recidivate than white de-
fendants, then judges may (consciously or subconsciously) punish black 
defendants more severely than similar white defendants.45  
B. The Critical Role of Prosecutors 
Judges’ sentencing discretion is constrained in a number of ways. 
Criminal statutes often prescribe a minimum and maximum sentence for a 
particular crime, which are set by the legislature when enacting the law that 
                                                                                                                           
influence judicial sentencing decisions.”); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Dis-
crimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 317 (1995) (explaining 
“‘[s]tatistical discrimination’ is based not on a psychological distaste for associating with blacks 
or women, but rather on sellers’ use of observable variables (such as race or gender) to make in-
ferences about a relevant but unobservable variable”); Sara Steen et al., Images of Danger and 
Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing, and Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 
435, 463 (2005) (arguing “because they lack complete information about individual cases, deci-
sion makers form causal attributions for offending and assess dangerousness and culpability by 
referencing stereotypes”). Theoretically, this model is closely related to the concept of statistical 
discrimination. See Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 91, 96–97 (describing the statistical discrimination model). 
 43 See Albonetti, Integration, supra note 42, at 250 (explaining “uncertainty surrounding the 
sentencing decision arises from an inability to predict accurately future criminal behavior”). 
 44 See, e.g., id. at 249–50 (“[J]udges would attempt to manage uncertainty in the sentencing 
decision by developing ‘patterned responses’ that are themselves the product of an attribution 
process influenced by causal judgments . . . These attributions provide a basis for arriving at ra-
tional decision in a domain of responsibility characterized by uncertainty.”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski 
et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 
(2009) (arguing that judges “hold implicit racial biases” and that such biases “can influence their 
judgment”). For an overview of the possible sources of implicit biases, see Jerry Kang et al., Im-
plicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128–35 (2012); Anthony G. Greenwald & 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 952–957 
(2006); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
969, 969–70 (2006) (providing examples of both explicit and implicit bias). 
 45 Judges may impose higher sentences on the defendants they perceive as being riskier to 
incapacitate them (i.e., prevent them from committing additional crimes) and to enhance the deter-
rent effect of criminal sentencing. See Albonetti, Integration, supra note 42, at 258 (explaining 
“[i]ncreases in sentence severity produced by the race variable support the causal attribution and 
uncertainty avoidance hypothesis linking black defendants with attributions of a high risk of future 
criminal behavior and judicial use of discretion as a means to deal with administrative concerns 
for reducing such risk”); Baradaran, supra note 2, at 176–77 (explaining that criminal justice ac-
tors often use group-based factors, rather than individual ones, to make bail, sentencing and parole 
decisions, which may lead to the inappropriate consideration of race in those decisions). 
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criminalizes a given actitivity. Additionally, various states and the federal 
government have sought to control the exercise of judicial discretion by 
adopting sentencing guidelines, which generally provide a set of recom-
mended sentencing ranges which are determined by an offense score (a 
function of the conviction crime) and the defendant’s criminal history.46 
The applicable sentencing guidelines range and statutory minimum and 
maximum sentences are ultimately determined by the conviction crime. Ex-
cept in cases adjudicated in bench trial, the judge has no direct control over 
the ultimate crime of conviction, which itself is, in the great majority of cases, 
a result of the plea-bargaining agreement between the defendant’s counsel 
and the prosecuting attorney.47 Not surprisingly, prosecutors are considered to 
be the most influential players in the criminal justice process.48 
Prosecutorial discretion in the plea-bargaining process plays an 
important role in determining the conviction crime. Serious charges that were 
initially filed against a defendant may be reduced to less serious ones and 
concurrent charges involving less serious crimes may be dropped altogether.49 
As a result of this process, charges involving felony crimes may be reduced to 
misdemeanors, or all charges carrying a possible incarceration term may be 
dropped or reduced to charges that carry no possible jail or prison time.50 
Furthermore, prosecutors also enjoy ample discretion in deciding which 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 1–7 (Aug. 
2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-
surveys/miscellaneous/201510_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZA3-HKH3]. Initially, 
the federal sentencing guidelines were mandatory in the sense that judges wishing to depart from 
the guidelines (i.e., impose a sentence above or below the guidelines range) had to justify their 
decision orally or in writing. See Schanzenbach, supra note 35, at 60 (describing federal 
sentencing guidelines). After the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines were 
unconstitutional, the sentencing guidelines began serving an advisory role, as one of the factors 
judges consider in determining a sentence. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); 
Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 729, 733–34 (2012). 
 47 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 46, at 5 (“Over 95 percent of federal defend-
ants convicted of a felony or Class A misdemeanor . . . are adjudicated guilty based on a guilty 
plea rather than a verdict at a trial.”). 
 48 See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 
5 (2007); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 
J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1326 (2014) (explaining “[l]egal scholars, judges and practitioners broadly 
agree that prosecutorial decisions play a dominant role in determining sentences”); Lauren O’Neill 
Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394, 398 (2010). 
 49 See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 48, at 395; Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, 
Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2007). 
 50 See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 48, at 395. 
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initial charges to file, a choice that defines the starting point of any plea-
bargaining negotiations.51 
In exercising their discretion, prosecutors may, like judges when im-
posing a sentence, be subject to implicit biases that adversely impact certain 
types of defendants.52 For example, prosecutors may consciously or sub-
consciously perceive race as a proxy for recidivism or latent criminality.53 
With limited information available and facing time and resource constraints, 
prosecutors may have to rely on such heuristics in their decision making.54 
And if that is the case, we would expect prosecutors to be on average more 
lenient on white defendants relative to black defendants, for example by 
agreeing to reduce the top charges faced by white defendants more often.55 
Under this model of prosecutorial decision-making, race should play a 
smaller role when prosecutors have access to other salient and easily avail-
able proxies about a defendant’s dangerousness. That is, one would expect 
the gap in charge reduction rates between white and black defendants to be 
smaller when the defendants share a characteristic that is associated with 
recidivism, such as a prior criminal record.56 Black defendants thus receive 
less “personalized” or “individualized” treatment—i.e., the differences in 
charge reductions between black defendants with and without criminal rec-
ords will be smaller than the difference in charge reductions between white 
defendants with and without criminal records.57 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 402 (“Prosecutors, like other organizational actors, are faced with uncertainty that 
may lead them to develop decision-making schema that incorporate past practices and reflect the 
subtle influences of social and cultural stereotypes in society.”). 
 53 See id. at 403 (“[P]rosecutors are likely to develop ‘perceptual shorthands’ that tie 
attributions of dangerousness to the ascriptive characteristics of offenders and their victims.”); 
supra note 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 54 See Faigman et al., supra note 44, at 1141–42 (arguing that that prosecutors are likely to be 
subject to implicit biases in the discharge of their duties given the fact that they have “wide discre-
tion” and have to make “quick decisions with little accountability”); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. 
Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SE-
ATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 796–98 (2012) (noting that prosecutors use determinations about the dan-
ger posed by an individual to society when exercising their discretion). 
 55 See infra notes 260–267 and accompanying text. 
 56 See Steen et al., supra note 42, at 460–61 (finding that “the likelihood of incarceration is 
virtually certain for both black and white offenders who fit the stereotype of a dangerous drug 
offender, but in the less-serious categories . . . judges are less likely to incarcerate white offenders 
than their black counterparts” and interpreting these findings “to mean that decision-makers are 
more likely to define low-level black offenders as a threat to public safety, and therefore deserving 
of incarceration, than similarly situated white offenders”). 
 57 See id. at 461 (explaining “decision makers do not appear to make sharp distinctions be-
tween the most ‘dangerous’ black offenders and most other black offenders. . . . Thus, a principal 
effect of minority status may be to produce less individualized, more homogenous decision mak-
ing”). 
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Surprisingly, empirical work analyzing the link between prosecutorial 
discretion and racial disparities is limited, at least compared to work 
analyzing judicial behavior and racial disparities in sentencing.58 Moreover, 
the conclusions reached by these studies have often been inconsistent.59 
Recent studies have focused on prosecutors’ initial charging decisions and the 
importance of charges involving mandatory minimum sentences in ultimately 
generating racial disparities in sentencing outcomes.60 Studies that have 
examined disparities in charge reductions and dismissals have mostly focused 
on a specific subset of crimes and have relied on a relatively low number of 
observations.61 Although some of these studies find that the race of the 
defendant has no effect on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in reducing 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. JUST., DO RACE AND ETHNICITY MATTER IN 
PROSECUTION? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 1 (June 2012), https://www.vera.org/publications/
do-race-and-ethnicity-matter-in-prosecution-a-review-of-empirical-studies (follow the “PDF” 
hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/NXZ7-S9K4] (explaining that “[r]elative to the attention that police 
and the courts have received from researchers analyzing disproportionate minority contact with 
the criminal justice system, there has been little study of prosecution”); Shermer & Johnson, supra 
note 48, at 395 (noting the scant literature in the area); Rehavi & Starr, supra note 48, at 1326 
(noting that “prior empirical studies of racial and other demographic disparities in sentencing have 
considered judicial sentencing decision only in isolation from the prosecutorial choices that pre-
ceded them”); Wayne S. McKenzie, Dir., Prosecution & Racial Justice Program, Vera Inst. Jus-
tice, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, Testimony Before the House Judiciary 
Committee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security 6 (Oct. 29, 2009) (transcript available on 
the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee website) (explaining the Prosecution & Racial 
Justice Program’s mission to collect and analyze data for prosecutors similar to already well-
established analysis of other actors in the justice system). 
 59 See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 58, at 7 (“While a review of the 34 studies discussed 
here suggests that defendants’ and victims’ race affect prosecutorial decisions, the findings are 
complex and somewhat difficult to interpret. Overall, research finds that the effect of race and 
ethnicity on prosecutorial decision making is inconsistent, and it is not always blacks or Latinos 
and Latinas who are treated more punitively.”). 
 60 See, e.g., Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 46, at 757 (finding that racial disparities 
may be exacerbated by the existence of statutory minimum sentences); Rehavi & Starr, supra note 
48, at 1335–36, 1344 (finding that 12.4% of black arrestees face an initial charge with a mandato-
ry minimum while 7.5% of the white arrestees do and that prosecutors’ decision to bring a charge 
carrying a mandatory minimum sentence explains more than half of the black-white sentence 
disparities not explained by other case or defendant characteristics). Some earlier studies did not 
find these racial disparities in initial charging decisions by prosecutors. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., 
supra note 58, at 7–11 (summarizing existing studies examining racial disparities in prosecutors’ 
initial charging decisions); Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427, 440–46 (2007) (finding no 
differences in prosecutors’ decision to bring charges with a mandatory minimum sentence against 
black and white drug offenders in Pennsylvania). 
 61 See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 58, at 12–14 (summarizing existing studies examin-
ing racial disparities in dismissals and charge reductions); Shermer & Johnson, supra note 48, at 
400 (describing the methodological limitations of existing studies examining racial disparities in 
dismissals and charge reductions). 
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or dismissing charges62 or that prosecutorial discretion may be used in a 
manner favorable to black offenders,63 others conclude that there are racial 
disparities in the plea-bargaining process disfavoring black defendants.64 
II. SENTENCING IN WISCONSIN AND DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
Section A of this Part presents an overview of the legal framework 
governing the criminal justice process in Wisconsin, focusing on the discre-
tion afforded to district attorneys and judges, followed by a brief description 
of recent incarceration trends in the state and its prison population.65 Sec-
                                                                                                                           
 62 See, e.g., Celesta A. Albonetti, Charge Reduction: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Burglary and Robbery Cases, 8 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 317, 323, 328 (1992) (analyzing 
400 burglary and robbery cases in Jacksonville, Florida, and finding no evidence of racial or gender 
disparities in prosecutors’ decision to reduce initial charges); Rodney Kingsnorth et al., Adult Sexual 
Assault: The Role of Racial/Ethnic Composition in Prosecution and Sentencing, 26 J. CRIM. JUST. 
359, 362–365 (1998) (finding no racial disparities in the prosecution and sentencing of cases in a 
sample of 365 sexual assaults in Sacramento County, California); Shermer & Johnson, supra note 48, 
at 420–21 (finding race of defendant does not affect likelihood of receiving a reduction in charges); 
EMILY OWENS ET AL., EXAMINING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL CASE OUTCOMES AMONG 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN SAN FRANCISCO 9 (2017), http://sfpublicdefender.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/2/2017/06/quattronefullreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/PY5W-2GDM] (finding that felony 
charges filed against white defendants represented by the San Franciso Public Defender’s Office 
were more likely to be downgraded (31%) than felony charges filed against black defendants 
represented by that same office, but that such disparities are not statistically significant after 
controlling for criminal history and booking charges). 
 63 See, e.g., Malcolm D. Holmes et al., Determinants of Charge Reductions and Final Dispo-
sitions in Cases of Burglary and Robbery, 24 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 233, 242–45 (1987) (find-
ing that black defendants accused of burglary and robbery offenses in Delaware County, Pennsyl-
vania are more likely to receive a charge reduction); Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of Ethnicity 
and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLO-
GY 175, 183–86 (1987) (finding that black-on-white sexual assaults were more likely to be dis-
missed by prosecutors than white-on-black assaults in a sample of 321 sexual assaults in a Michi-
gan county); John Wooldredge & Amy Thistlethwaite, Bilevel Disparities in Court Dispositions 
for Intimate Assault, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 417, 437–39 (2004) (finding that black offenders are less 
likely to be charged and fully prosecuted relative to white offenders in a study of 2,948 male ar-
rests for misdemeanor intimate assaults in Cincinnati, Ohio). 
 64 See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. JUSTICE, RACE AND PROSECUTION IN 
MANHATTAN 6 (July 2014), https://www.vera.org/publications/race-and-prosecution-in-manhattan 
(follow Research Summary “PDF” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/8NX7-UVTE] (analyzing a sam-
ple of misdemeanor and felony drug cases in New York City and finding that “[a]lthough some 
evidence emerged that black defendants were less likely to receive an offer of a lower charge than 
were similarly situated white defendants, this difference was not statistically significant due to a 
relatively small sample size”); Besiki Luka Kutateladze et al., Opening Pandora’s Box: How Does 
Defendant Race Influence Plea Bargaining?, 33 JUST. Q. 398, 414 (2016) (finding in a sample of 
misdemeanor marijuana cases in New York County that black defendants are less likely than 
white defendants to be offered a charge reduction); Spohn et al., supra note 63, at 183–86 (finding 
that Hispanic and black males are more likely to be fully prosecuted in a sample of cases from Los 
Angeles county). 
 65 See infra notes 72–101 and accompanying text. 
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tion B describes the dataset and the construction of the variables used in the 
empirical analyses presented later in the Article.66 
Before proceeding further, it is worth explaining the choice of Wisconsin 
as the jurisdiction in which to conduct this study. The most important reason 
is the nature of the available data. Wisconsin courts maintain records that in-
clude a comprehensive set of information for each criminal action, allowing 
us to follow a case from the initial filing of charges, through the dismissal or 
reduction of charges, and up to adjudication and sentencing.67 Similar data-
bases maintained by other states or the federal government are more limited 
in their scope, often including only cases which resulted in a conviction and 
containing only sentencing information.68 Another important consideration 
for choosing Wisconsin is its geographical location. Existing evidence sug-
gests that racial disparities in dismissals are greater in southern states.69  
A. Criminal Justice in Wisconsin 
This section provides a brief overview of the criminal justice process 
in Wisconsin, which informs the construction of the variables and design of 
the analyses described later. The first subsection describes the criminal jus-
tice process in Wisconsin—from the time charges are initially filed in a case 
by the prosecutor to the point where the judge imposes a sentence.70 The 
second subsection provides general information on Wisconsin’s prison pop-
ulation and existing racial disparities in incarceration rates.71 
1. The Criminal Justice Process 
Circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine all criminal ac-
tions and proceedings in Wisconsin.72 With a few exceptions, each county 
in the state has its own circuit court, with the number of branches (or judg-
es)73 varying from circuit to circuit.74 Circuit court judges are elected at the 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See infra notes 102–116 and accompanying text. 
 67 For an overview of the data see infra notes 112–116 and accompanying text. 
 68 See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 48, at 396 (sumarizing existing literature on the topic); 
id. at 420 (“The limited empirical attention devoted to prosecutorial discretion is largely the result 
of data limitations. Whereas data on judicial sentencing decisions are now readily available, 
records on prosecutorial charging behavior remain elusive.”). 
 69 See Travis W. Franklin, Community Influence on Prosecutorial Dismissals: A Multilevel 
Analysis of Case- and County-Level Factors, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 693, 699–700 (2010). 
 70 See infra notes 72–90 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 91–101 and accompanying text. 
 72 See WIS. STAT. § 753.03 (2018). 
 73 See id. § 753.061(1). 
 74 See id. § 753.06. Dane County, which has its own circuit court, has seventeen branches (or 
judges). See id. § 753.06(5)(a). 
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circuit court level for a term of six years.75 Similarly, with a few exceptions, 
each county in the state also encompasses a prosecutorial unit and elects a 
district attorney who serves a term of four years.76 
Charging and plea-bargaining decisions are made by the local district 
attorney’s office.77 Prosecutorial discretion in this respect is quite broad so 
long as the charges are supported by probable cause.78 Although judges do 
review plea bargains, in practice few agreements are rejected.79 As in other 
jurisdictions, the minority of cases which are not resolved via a plea agree-
ment are adjudicated at a bench or jury trial.80 Once a defendant has been 
convicted of a particular crime, Wisconsin law provides the presiding judge 
ample discretion in choosing the appropriate sentence.81 
Wisconsin does not have a set of sentencing guidelines providing a 
mandatory or advisory sentencing range based on the crime committed by the 
defendant and the defendant’s criminal history.82 Also, few crimes carry a 
mandatory minimum sentence.83 Most crimes are classified into classes of 
felonies or misdemeanors, with each class carrying its own maximum penal-
ty.84 Currently, there are nine classes of felony crimes85 and three classes of 
misdemeanors.86 Certain statutory provisions allow for sentencing enhance-
ments which increase the possible maximum sentence a judge may impose, 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id. § 753.01. 
 76 See id. § 978.01. 
 77 See Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing Policies and Practices in Wisconsin, OXFORD HAND-
BOOKS ONLINE 7 (Mar. 2016) (on file with author). 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See WIS. STAT. § 972.02 (2018). 
 81 See infra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
 82 See O’Hear, supra note 77, at 1; supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 83 See O’Hear, supra note 77, at 8 (noting that few crimes carry a mandatory minimum and 
that the most important of these are Class A felonies which carry a mandatory life sentence). 
 84 See id.; infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 85 The classes of felony crimes are as follows, with maximum sentences in parenthesis: A 
(Life), B (60 years), C (40 years), D (25 years), E (15 years), F (12.5 years), G (10 years), H (6 
years), and I (3.5 years). WIS. STAT. § 939.50. Prior to 2002, there were six classes of felonies: A 
(Life), B (60 years), BC (30 years), C (15 years), D (10 years), and E (5 years). WIS. STAT. 
§ 939.50 (1999). Three new classes of felony crimes were added as part of a broader reform to the 
criminal system in 2002. See 2001 WIS. ACT 109 §§ 545–559 (July 26, 2002) (amending WIS. 
STAT. § 939.50). Prior to this reform, a number of drug offenses, among others, had maximum 
sentences that were set by statute and not keyed to a class. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 961.41 (setting 
sentence lengths for certain controlled substance offenses). 
 86 The three classes of misdemeanor crimes are the following, with maximum prison sentenc-
es in parenthesis: A (9 months), B (90 days), and C (30 days). See WIS. STAT. § 939.51 (2018). 
More generally, misdemeanors are defined as crimes that are not punishable by imprisonment in a 
state prison. See id. § 939.60. 
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but these are advisory in nature and not ultimately binding.87 If a defendant is 
convicted of more than one count that carries a potential sentence, the judge 
may impose sentences for each count to be served concurrently or consecu-
tively.88 Except for crimes involving a Class A felony, the sentencing judge 
also has the discretion to impose probation instead of a sentence carrying an 
incarceration term.89 Sentences imposed by judges in Wisconsin are defini-
tive, as defendants are required to serve the full term of their sentences with-
out the possibility of parole or early release due to good behavior.90 
2. Prison Population and Incarceration Rates 
Historically, Wisconsin had imprisonment rates that were lower on aver-
age than those of other states.91 Nevertheless, starting in the late 1970s, Wis-
consin’s imprisonment rate began to converge to the national average, a trend 
that has been linked to increases in the state’s violent crimes rates and the 
associated increase in incarceration rates and length of sentences.92 This in-
crease in the prison population has been accompanied by a shift in the com-
position of inmates from property offenders to violent and sexual offenders.93 
These high imprisonment rates go hand in hand with significant racial dis-
parities, as African Americans have consistently been overrepresented in Wis-
consin’s prison population.94 As of 2010, African Americans represented for-
                                                                                                                           
 87 See O’Hear, supra note 77, at 7–8. For example, if a violent felony was committed in a 
designated school zone, the applicable maximum sentence is increased by five years. See WIS. 
STAT. § 939.632(2). 
 88 See O’Hear, supra note 77, at 7. 
 89 See WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3). A judge choosing to impose probation has wide discretion in 
structuring a probationary scheme. See O’Hear, supra note 77, at 8. The judge may withhold sen-
tencing altogether, or impose a sentence of incarceration and stay it for the duration of probation. 
See WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1)(a). In cases where sentencing is withheld, a defendant that violates 
probation requirements has to return to court to be sentenced by a judge. See Community Correc-
tions—General Information, WIS. DEP’T CORRS., https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/AboutDOC/Community
Corrections/GeneralInformation.aspx#ppes [http://perma.cc/HAB4-DJ8V]. If a sentence was im-
posed but stayed, a defendant that violates a condition in its probation is automatically incarcer-
ated for the term of the original sentence. Id. 
 90 See Michael O’Hear, Good Conduct Time for Prisoners: Why (and How) Wisconsin Should 
Provide Credits Toward Early Release, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 487, 496 (2014); O’Hear, supra note 
77, at 8. This applies to all felony offenses committed on or after December 31, 1999. See O’Hear, 
supra note 77, at 16. Additionally, although appellate courts review judges’ sentencing decisions, 
the process is not very rigorous and seldom leads to the overturning of a sentence. See Michael 
O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the Wisconsin and Federal 
Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 762 (2009); O’Hear, supra note 77, at 9–11. 
 91 See O’Hear, supra note 77, at 2. 
 92 See Michael M. O’Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern States: Origins and 
Trends, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 709, 741 (2013); O’Hear, supra note 77, at 2–3. 
 93 See O’Hear, supra note 77, at 6. 
 94 See id. at 7. 
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ty-three percent of the prison population, a figure that dwarfs the group’s sev-
en percent share of the total population.95 In fact, Wisconsin has one of the 
country’s highest incarceration rates for African American males,96 as well as 
one of the highest race-based differentials in incarceration rates.97 
These striking racial disparities in imprisonment rates are mostly driv-
en by Milwaukee County, which has a higher imprisonment rate than the 
other counties in the state, as well as the highest proportion of African 
Americans.98 According to a 2015 report, Milwaukee was home to one-sixth 
of the state population but accounted for about a quarter of prison admis-
sions.99 Such rates coupled with the fact that seventy percent of Wisconsin’s 
African American population lives in Milwaukee County explains a good 
share of the state’s racial disparities in imprisonment rates.100 Notably, over 
fifty percent of Milwaukee’s black males between thirty and fifty years old 
are serving, or have at some point served, time in a state prison.101 
B. Description of the Data 
The first subsection provides an overview of the dataset used to con-
duct the analyses presented later in the Article.102 The second subsection 
describes how the different variables were constructed.103 
1. Overview of the Database 
The data comes from the public records of the Wisconsin Circuit 
Courts, which are available electronically at the Wisconsin Circuit Court 
Access website.104 This site provides the case information entered into the 
Consolidated Court Automation Programs (“CCAP”) case management sys-
tem by court staff in the Wisconsin Circuit Courts where the files are locat-
                                                                                                                           
 95 See NELLIS, supra note 4, at 16; CHRISTINA D. CARMICHAEL, WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL 
BUREAU, ADULT CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 12 (2011), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/
informational_papers/january_2011/0057_adult_corrections_program_informational_paper_57.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ADZ5-Y996]. 
 96 See JOHN PAWASARAT & LOIS M. QUINN, UNIV. WIS. MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN’S MASS 
INCARCERATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES: WORKFORCE CHALLENGES FOR 2013, at 8 
(2013), http://www4.uwm.edu/eti/2013/BlackImprisonment.pdf [http://perma.cc/BE2N-79BH]. 
 97 See NELLIS, supra note 4, at 8. 
 98 See O’Hear, supra note 77, at 6. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See Pawasarat & Quinn, supra note 96, at 12. 
 102 See infra notes 104–111 and accompanying text. 
 103 See infra notes 112–116 and accompanying text. 
 104 WIS. COURT SYS. CIRCUIT COURT ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov/index.xsl. 
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ed.105 The focus of this study is those cases labeled as criminal misdemean-
ors or criminal felonies,106 which involve offenses committed after Decem-
ber 31, 1999107 and adjudicated before December 31, 2006.108 
The analyses presented later in the Article restrict the sample to cases 
filed and adjudicated in Dane County. Focusing on a single county is advan-
tageous to the extent that it helps maintain a number of factors relating to 
law enforcement and the criminal justice process (such as district attorney 
office and judges) constant. A natural choice would be Milwaukee County, 
the largest county of the state by population. Nevertheless, its high incarcer-
ation rates and demographical make-up does not make it an ideal candidate 
as it is not representative of the state.109 Dane County, which includes the 
capital city of Madison, is the second most populous county in the state af-
ter Milwaukee County110 and has a demographic make-up that reflects that 
of the state as a whole.111 In addition, the coding of different variables in the 
datasets appeared to be more consistent in Dane County relative to Milwau-
kee County. 
Cases which were transferred to another county or jurisdiction before 
adjudication or that deal with the extradition of a defendant to another state 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Case Search, WIS. COURT SYS., https://www.wicourts.gov/casesearch.htm [http://perma.
cc/L7NE-GGWV]. Some counties started using CCAP during 1991, but Dane county began using 
the system in January 1995. See When Wisconsin Counties Began Using CCAP, WIS. COURT SYS. 
CIRCUIT COURT ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov/countyOnCCAP.xsl [http://perma.cc/9L9D-
T6RC]. Several counties, including Dane, have loaded their historical cases to the system, making 
them available on the Wisconsin Circuit Court Access system. See Help, WIS. COURT SYS. CIRCUIT 
COURT ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov/help.xsl [http://perma.cc/B3NF-ADRB].  
 106 Frequently Asked Questions, WIS. COURT SYS. CIRCUIT COURT ACCESS, https://wcca.
wicourts.gov/faq.xsl#Faq15 [http://perma.cc/3BSE-PUJ4] (Frequently Asked Question #15: “Could 
You Describe What the Different Case Types Mean?”). 
 107 This restriction is imposed so that only cases adjudicated under the Truth in Sentencing 
Law are included. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 108 The Wisconsin Circuit Court provided all available information in the CCAP system for 
all cases resolved on or before December 31, 2006. 
 109 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 110 As of 2010, Dane county had a population of 488,073 and Milwaukee county had a popula-
tion of 947,735. See David Egan-Robertson, Population and Race Data, Wisconsin County Subdivi-
sions (Minor Civil Divisions), Census 2000 and 2010 Comparisons, WIS. DEP’T ADMIN. (Mar. 
2011), https://doa.wi.gov/DIR/Pop_Race_MCD_2000_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/SM62-Y4TD]. Dane 
County also has the second largest number of cases in the dataset. Of the 704,190 cases in the 
dataset involving commissions—on or after January 1, 2000—of felony or misdemeanor offenses, 
116,541 were filed in Milwaukee County, while 51,028 were filed in Dane County. 
 111 According to the 2010 census, 86.2% of the Wisconsin population was white. That number 
is considerably lower in Milwaukee, where only 60.6% of the population was white according to 
census data. See Egan-Robertson, supra note 110. In Dane county, on the other hand, 84.7% of the 
population was white. See id. The other major racial groups in Dane county are Hispanics (5.9% 
of the population), African Americans (5.2% of the population), and Asians (4.7% of the popula-
tion). See id. 
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are excluded from the final dataset. Also excluded are cases that involve de-
fendants which are legal persons (such as businesses) or defendants who were 
found not to be mentally competent. The final dataset contains 48,368 cases. 
Of these, 17,561 included at least a felony crime as part of the initial charges, 
while the remaining 30,807 involved misdemeanor and lesser charges. 
2. Construction of the Variables 
The data made available by the CCAP is quite detailed. One file of the 
dataset provides demographical information on the defendant—including 
the defendant’s name, gender, race, and date of birth. I used this information 
to create variables for the defendant’s gender,112 age,113 and race.114 One key 
variable not directly contained in the dataset is the criminal history of the 
defendant. Nevertheless, the fact that the data contain the full name and date 
of birth of the defendant allows us to generate a variable to measure a de-
fendant’s criminal history. Using the defendant information dataset together 
with the judgment disposition dataset115 I was able to calculate the number 
of times a defendant had been convicted prior to the adjudication of a given 
case.116 
The database also contained detailed information for each individual 
charge in a case, including the initial crime a defendant was charged with, 
as well as the crime with which the defendant was ultimately charged. For 
                                                                                                                           
 112 The variable Female is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a defendant’s gender is coded in 
CCAP as female and 0 if the defendant’s gender is coded as male. 
 113 The variable Age is constructed by subtracting the defendant’s year of birth from the year 
in which the case was originally filed. For cases missing a defendant’s age, the average age in the 
sample is imputed. 
 114 Defendants were divided into three groups based on the race description provided in the 
CCAP data: (1) white, (2) black, and (3) other. This last group includes Hispanic, Asian and Na-
tive American defendants, as well as defendants for whom race information was not available. 
 115 That dataset contains sentencing information for those cases in which a defendant was 
convicted of at least one of the charges filed against him or her. Records relating to offenses 
committed before the year 2000 were also employed to measure the prior criminal record of de-
fendants. 
 116 Defendants were matched based on first name, last name, and month and year of birth to 
create a unique identifier. For each case in the dataset, the following two variables were generated: 
(i) Prior1, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant had one prior conviction, and (ii) Pri-
or2+, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant had two or more prior convictions. Defend-
ants with no prior convictions are coded with a 0 in both of these indicator variables. This method 
of calculating this variable is certainly not precise. One concern is that of false positives—if two 
individuals have the same name and date of birth, then the number of priors for these individuals 
will be artificially inflated. It is worth noting that the nature of the sample (i.e., just individuals 
charged with a crime) reduces the likelihood of such false positives occurring. Additionally, for 
these false positives to bias the results, one would need such false positives to be systematically 
correlated with the race of the defendant. 
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each final charge the dataset contained information on the final adjudication 
of the charge—whether it was dismissed, whether the defendant pled guilty 
or no contest, or whether the defendant was found guilty or innocent at trial. 
Another dataset contained the sentencing information for those charges for 
which defendants were convicted, i.e., whether the defendant was given a 
jail or prison sentence (and the number of months), whether the defendant 
was put on probation, or whether the defendant was assessed a monetary 
penalty. 
For each case, I collected information on the initial set of charges: the 
highest crime class (i.e., the highest possible sentence for all charges), as 
well as a general count of the number of felony and misdemeanor offenses 
the defendant was initially charged with. The same information was record-
ed for the final set of charges for which the defendant was convicted—i.e., 
the highest crime class, the number of charges by crime class group, as well 
as a general count of the number of felony and misdemeanor convictions. 
Finally, I recorded the highest sentence received by the defendant for all 
charges. I then constructed different outcome and control variables based on 
these variables. These outcome and control variables are described in more 
detail in the discussion of the results presented in the next section. 
III. RESULTS 
Section A of this Part explores racial differences at the sentencing stage, 
where a judge chooses which penalty to impose given the crimes of which a 
defendant has been convicted.117 The results are similar to those in the exist-
ing literature and confirm the presence of significant disparities in incarcera-
tion rates and sentence lengths of black and white defendants. Section B of 
this Part examines racial disparities during the plea-bargaining process, i.e., 
the period between the filing of initial charges and a defendant’s conviction 
by guilty plea.118 The results reveal that white defendants are more likely than 
black defendants to see their initial charges reduced and dropped during this 
process. Section C sheds further light on the disparities discussed in Section 
B by discussing racial disparities in the filing of initial charges.119 
A. Racial Disparities in Sentencing 
I start by analyzing racial disparities at the sentencing stage, that is, at 
the point where the defendant has been convicted of a given crime and the 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See infra notes 120–151 and accompanying text. 
 118 See infra notes 152–267 and accompanying text. 
 119 See infra notes 268–276 and accompanying text. 
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judge imposes a sentence according to any applicable statutory guidelines. 
This stage has been the focus of most previous empirical work analyzing 
racial disparities in criminal case outcomes.120 Table 1 presents summary 
statistics of sentencing outcomes for those cases in which the defendant was 
convicted of a crime that carries a possible jail or prison sentence.121 
Table 1. Sentencing Outcomes by Race122 
Panel A – All Cases 
  
(1) (2) 
 
Obs. Incarceration Sentence 
White 18,282 34.88% 2.84 
Black 14,867 51.99% 4.85 
    Panel B – All Cases with Felony Convictions 
  
(1) (2) 
 
Obs. Incarceration Sentence 
White 5,262 36.94% 8.09 
Black 4,620 48.74% 12.68 
    Panel C – All Cases with Misdemeanor Convictions 
  
(1) (2) 
 
Obs. Incarceration Sentence 
White 13,020 34.04% 0.72 
Black 10,247 53.42% 1.32 
        
 
As documented in the existing literature, black defendants are signifi-
cantly more likely to receive a prison sentence than white defendants. The 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See supra notes 65–116 and accompanying text. 
 121 Cases in which the defendant was acquitted, in which the charges were dropped, or in 
which the defendant was only convicted of a crime that does not carry a possible sentence, such as 
forfeitures, are not included in the analyses in this section. 
 122 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: Panel 
A includes all cases in which the defendant was convicted of a crime which carries a possible 
sentence in jail or prison. Panel B includes only those cases in which the defendant was convicted 
of at least one felony. Panel C includes those cases in which the defendant was convicted of at 
least one misdemeanor, but of no felonies. Column (1) in each panel reports the average incarcera-
tion rate for each race group, while column (2) reports the average highest sentence received by a 
defendant (in months). 
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incarceration rate for black defendants is 51.99%, substantially higher than 
that of white defendants, 34.88%.123 In other words, black defendants are 
about fifty percent more likely than white defendants to be incarcerated.124 
Additionally, black defendants receive sentences that are on average two 
months longer than those received by white defendants (4.85 months versus 
2.84 months).125 This difference is substantial in relative terms—the sen-
tences received by black defendants are over seventy percent longer than 
those received by white defendants.126 
In Panel B and Panel C of Table 1, cases are divided into two groups—
those cases in which there was at least one felony conviction (Panel B) and 
those cases in which defendants were only convicted of misdemeanor 
crimes (Panel C). Black defendants convicted of at least one felony are 
11.8% more likely than white defendants to be incarcerated (48.74% versus 
36.94%)127 and receive sentences that are on average 4.59 months longer 
than those received by white defendants (12.68 months versus 8.09 
months).128 Looking at sentencing in misdemeanor cases reveals relatively 
greater disparities. In these cases, black defendants are 19.38% more likely 
than white defendants to be incarcerated (53.42% versus 34.04%)129 and 
receive sentences that are on average 0.60 months longer than those re-
ceived by white defendants (1.32 months versus 0.72 months).130 
As discussed earlier, there are several factors that affect judges’ sen-
tencing decisions. For example, the type and severity of the crime, the 
number of concurrent convictions, and the criminal history of the defendant 
all play a role on sentencing determinations.131 Other demographic charac-
teristics of defendants—such as age and gender—also appear to play a role 
in sentencing outcomes.132 One concern is that black defendants are more 
likely than white defendants to exhibit those characteristics and commit 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (Table 1, panel A, column (1)). 
 124 This is equal to the difference in incarceration rates (17.11% points) divided by the incar-
ceration rate of white defendants (34.88%). 
 125 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (Table 1, panel A, column (2)). 
 126 These figures include those cases in which a sentence of zero months was imposed. 
 127 This difference represents 31.94% of the incarceration rate of white defendants. 
 128 That is, black defendants convicted of a felony offense receive sentences that are 56.56% 
longer than those received by white defendants. 
 129 This difference represents 56.93% of the incarceration rate of white defendants convicted 
of a misdemeanor offense. 
 130 Although small in magnitude, this difference represents over 80% of the average sentence 
for white defendants in misdemeanor cases. 
 131 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. This is a reason why comparing raw sen-
tencing data can be misleading—if black defendants are convicted of more serious crimes than 
white defendants, for example, then it should not be surprising to find that black defendants are 
incarcerated more often and receive on average longer sentences. 
 132 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
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those types of crimes that correlate with longer sentences.133 To provide a 
more rigorous analysis of the role of race in sentencing decisions we can 
estimate the following specification: 
iiiiii ZXOtherBlackSent eββββ ++++ 4321=  (1) 
The outcome of interest, Senti, is the length of the sentence (in months) 
associated with case i.134 Blacki is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the de-
fendant’s race was coded as African-American, while Otheri is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the defendant was coded as a race other than African-
American or Caucasian.135 The vector X contains an additional set of 
defendant controls, including (i) the age of the defendant;136 (ii) the 
defendant’s gender;137 and (iii) the defendant’s prior criminal history.138 The 
vector Z contains a set of crime and case characteristics, including (i) 
Concurrenti, which is equal to 1 if the defendant was convicted of an 
additional crime; (ii) Triali, a variable equal to 1 if the case was adjudicated by 
a bench or jury trial;139 (iii) CrimeDescji, a set of indicator variables 
controlling for the type of crime involved in the defendant’s principal 
conviction charge;140 (iv) MaxSentji, a set of indicator variables controlling for 
the maximum statutory sentence for the most severe crime of which the 
defendant was convicted;141 and (v) Yearji, a set of fixed effects for the year in 
which a case was initially filed. Finally, ie  is a mean–zero stochastic error 
term.142 
                                                                                                                           
 133 For example, if black defendants are more likely to be male than white defendants or are 
on average younger than white defendants, then some of the difference captured in the earlier 
analyses may be attributed to those “hidden” characteristics. 
 134 Life sentences are coded as 721 months, which is one month longer than the maximum 
statutory sentence for Class B felonies. WIS. STAT. § 939.50 (2018). 
 135 Thus, in these regressions, white defendants (i.e., Caucasian) are the omitted race group. 
 136 See supra notes 39, 113 and accompanying text. 
 137 See supra notes 40, 112 and accompanying text. 
 138 See supra notes 37, 116 and accompanying text. 
 139 Cases adjudicated via trial tend to be characterized by more severe punishment. See Stef-
fensmeier & Demuth, Outcomes, supra note 35, at 716 (noting that trials are associated with high-
er probability of incarceration and longer sentence length compared to guilty pleas). 
 140 These are based on the corresponding chapter of the Wisconsin criminal code that covers 
the principal conviction offense. Crime categories with less than fifty observations are grouped 
together. There are fifty-one different crime category groups used in the analyses involving sen-
tencing. 
 141 All results presented in this Article are qualitatively similar if one uses the applicable max-
imum statutory sentence as a linear control instead of as a fixed effect. 
 142 Unless otherwise noted, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used in calculating 
the statistical significance of coefficients of all regressions estimated in this Article. These adjust-
ed standard errors account for the possibility that the variance of unobservable variables differs 
across segments of the sample. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: 
A MODERN APPROACH 264–71 (4th ed. 2006). 
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The results for this baseline specification is presented in column (1) of 
Table 2. The coefficient on the indicator variable Black measures the differ-
ence in the length of sentences received by black and white defendants after 
controlling for the other variables included in the regression. Black defend-
ants receive on average sentences that are 1.23 months longer than white 
defendants, a difference that is statistically significant and represents 32.6% 
of the average sentence in this sample of cases (3.77 months).143 
Table 2. Explaining Sentencing Outcomes144 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Felonies Misdemeanors 
  Sent. Incarc. Sent. Incarc. Sent. Incarc. 
Black 1.232*** 0.151*** 3.186*** 0.102*** 0.443*** 0.171*** 
 [0.178] 
[0.006] [0.601] [0.011] [0.031] [0.007] 
Other 0.577 0.085
*** 1.808 0.109*** 0.095* 0.078*** 
 [0.512] 
[0.013] [1.921] [0.025] [0.057] [0.015] 
Female 
-1.014*** 
-
0.126*** 
-2.795*** 
-
0.184*** 
-
0.379*** 
-
0.110*** 
 
[0.171] [0.008] [0.613] [0.015] [0.034] [0.009] 
Age 0.053*** 0.003*** 0.199*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 
 
[0.010] [0.000] [0.034] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Prior (1) 0.880*** 0.092*** 3.037*** 0.085*** 0.174*** 0.093*** 
 
[0.283] [0.009] [1.053] [0.018] [0.025] [0.010] 
Prior (2+) 2.563*** 0.254*** 6.623*** 0.251*** 1.020*** 0.257*** 
 
[0.247] [0.006] [0.897] [0.013] [0.030] [0.007] 
ConcCov 1.700*** 0.012* 11.130*** 0.185*** -0.497 -0.097 
 
[0.244] [0.007] [1.193] [0.015] [1.081] [0.318] 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See infra note 144 and accompanying text (Table 2, column (1)). 
 144 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: Ro-
bust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
The outcome variable in columns (1), (3) and (5) is the length (in months) of the highest sentence 
(capped at 720 months) received by the defendant. The outcome variable in columns (2), (4) and 
(6) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant received a prison or jail sentence. Columns 
(1), (3) and (5) present the results of ordinary least squares specifications, while columns (2), (4) 
and (6) present the marginal effects from a probit model. For a description of the explanatory 
variables of interest see infra note 304 and accompanying text (Appendix 1: Table 1). All regres-
sions include a set of crime class fixed effects (i.e., maximum statutory sentence), a set of crime 
type fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. 
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Trial 41.480*** 0.219*** 57.440*** 0.287*** 1.573*** 0.067 
 
[5.938] [0.033] [8.538] [0.039] [0.475] [0.060] 
Mean  
Outcomes 3.774 0.424 10.302 0.419 0.975 0.426 
Obs. 35,362 35,150 10,615 10,601 24,747 24,536 
R-squared 0.438   0.453 
 
0.092 
 
              
 
Columns (3) and (5) of Table 2 presents the same analyses for those 
cases involving a felony conviction and those cases involving misdemeanor 
convictions only, respectively. For both type of cases, the coefficient on the 
black indicator variable is relatively large and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Black defendants convicted of at least one felony offense receive 
prison sentences that are 3.19 months higher than those received by white 
defendants, a difference that represents 30.9% of the average felony sen-
tence in the sample.145 Although the difference in sentences received by 
black and white defendants in cases involving misdemeanor convictions, 
0.44 months, is small in magnitude, it represents 45.4% of the average sen-
tence in the misdemeanors sample.146 
The rate of incarceration, or, the percentage of cases in which a de-
fendant is sentenced to prison or jail, is another informative outcome varia-
ble. Because this outcome is a binary variable (i.e., equal to 1 if the defend-
ant was incarcerated and 0 if the defendant was not), we can estimate a pro-
bit model using the same explanatory variables included in specification (1) 
above.147 Columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 2 present the estimates of the 
marginal effects for the explanatory variables in these probit models.148 
Black defendants are generally 15.1% more likely than white defendants to 
be incarcerated, a difference that represents 35.6% of the average incarcera-
tion rate in the data.149 Looking separately at felony and misdemeanor cases 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (Table 2, column (3)). 
 146 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (Table 2, column (5)). 
 147 For a discussion of the probit model and other models for binary outcome variables see 
ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN THE LAW 298–304 (2d ed. 2016); 
WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 142, at 580–87. 
 148 These marginal effects indicate how the probability of the outcome variable (i.e., likeli-
hood of incarceration) varies when the value of a given explanatory variable changes, holding all 
other variables constant. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 142 at, 585. For example, the marginal 
effects of the indicator variable Black in this probit model tells us how the probability of the de-
fendant being incarcerated changes if we were to switch the race of the defendant from white to 
black. Estimating these models as linear probability models using ordinary least squares regres-
sions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors yields similar results. 
 149 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (Table 2, column (2)). 
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reveals similar disparities in incarceration rates, although the differences are 
greater in the latter. In cases involving felony convictions, black defendants 
are 10.2% more likely than white defendants to be incarcerated, a difference 
that represents 24.3% of the average incarceration rate for felonies.150 In 
misdemeanor cases, the rate of incarceration for black defendants is 17.1% 
higher than that of white defendants, a difference representing 40.1% of the 
average incarceration rate for misdemeanor convictions.151 
B. Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining 
The results presented above show that black defendants are incarcer-
ated at higher rates than white defendants and that the former also receive 
longer prison and jail sentences.152 The decision whether to impose a prison 
or jail sentence, as well as the length of a given sentence, is largely at the 
discretion of the judge.153 It is not surprising then that most of the literature 
exploring racial disparities in sentencing have focused on judges’ decision 
making.154 Nevertheless, the sentencing hearing is the last stage of a process 
in which many other actors in the criminal justice process make decisions 
that have a substantial impact on a defendant’s ultimate sentencing out-
come. For example, police officers choose whether or not to arrest a sus-
pect.155 Prosecutors decide which charges (if any) to initially file against a 
defendant and whether to subsequently drop or amend a charge, often as 
part of a plea-bargaining agreement negotiated with the defendant’s coun-
sel.156 The judge sitting at the end of this process takes the choices made by 
these actors—for example, the crime of conviction agreed upon in a plea 
bargain—as a given when determining the appropriate sentence.157 
Understanding the role played by a defendant’s race in these earlier 
phases is critical if we wish to identify the various factors driving racial dis-
parities in the criminal justice process and design effective reforms to reduce 
these disparities. Sentencing guidelines, which restrict the discretion of the 
judge in imposing a sentence, are an example of such a policy proposal that 
was adopted by a number of states as well as by the federal government.158 
More recent efforts have focused on eliminating mandatory minimum sen-
                                                                                                                           
 150 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (Table 2, column (4)). 
 151 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (Table 2, column (6)). 
 152 See supra notes 123–126 and accompanying text. 
 153 See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
 154 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 155 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 156 See supra notes 48–51, 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 157 See supra notes 46, 82–89 and accompanying text. 
 158 See supra notes 46 and accompanying text.  
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tences.159 Having a better understanding of the sources of racial disparities 
throughout the criminal justice process provides a more complete framework 
to assess existing reforms and try to think of different ways to address this 
problem more effectively. Subsection one explores racial disparities in charge 
reduction and the severity of the crime to which defendants plead guilty.160 
Subsection two analyzes racial disparities in the in charge reduction, while 
taking into account the defendants’ criminal histories.161 Subsection three dis-
cusses racial disparities in charge reduction, taking into account various de-
fendant characteristics and crime characteristics.162 Subsection four examines 
the effect of prosecutor and defense counsel on plea-bargaining outcomes.163 
Subsection five explores the possibility that prosecutors use race as a proxy 
for criminality when making decisions in plea-bargaining.164 
1. Charge Reductions and Crime Severity 
One way to measure disparities in the process leading to the sentencing 
stage is to compare the rates at which different defendants plead guilty to 
the initial principal charge, or conversely, the rates at which different de-
fendants end up pleading guilty to a reduced charge.165 Such charge 
reduction is one of the most important outcomes in plea-bargaining, as 
sentence length is often determined by the severity of the crime of which 
the defendant is ultimately convicted.166 The analyses in this section focuses 
on those cases in which a defendant was initially charged with a crime that 
carries a potential jail or prison sentence (regardless of whether the defend-
ant was convicted of the crime or eventually received a jail or prison sen-
tence). To better capture the effect of plea-bargaining, the analyses in this 
part also exclude cases which were adjudicated in a trial, cases in which all 
charges were dismissed before the defendant’s initial appearance, and cases 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Rehavi & Starr, supra note 48, at 1349–51; Douglas A. Berman & Harlan Protass, A 
Saner Approach to Sentencing, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2013, 8:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324266904578462770395465286 [https://perma.cc/EK8K-CGF2]. Existing evi-
dence suggests that the existence of statutory minimum sentences contributes to racial disparities. 
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 165–195 and accompanying text. 
 161 See infra notes 197–209 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 210–230 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 232–259 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 260–267 and accompanying text. 
 165 This follows Shermer and Johnson who define their charge reduction outcome as a 
reduction in the statutory maximum between the filing offense and the offense of conviction. See 
Shermer & Johnson, supra note 48, at 15. Following Shermer and Johnson, for cases involving 
multiple charges and concurrent sentences, the statutory maximum for the most serious charge 
(i.e., that with the highest statutory maximum) is used. Id. 
 166 See Wright & Engen, supra note 49, at 9. 
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in which the highest charge was dismissed by the court by the defendant’s 
motion or on its own.167 
Generally, white defendants see their top charge dropped or reduced in 
45.4% of the cases, while the charge reduction rate for black defendants is 
considerably lower, 35.98%.168 That is, white defendants are over twenty-five 
percent more likely than black defendants to see their top charge dropped or 
reduced than black defendants.169 The analyses that follow explore racial dis-
parities in charge reduction separately for different crimes based on their se-
verity.170 Subsection (a) discusses cases in which the initial charges are mis-
demeanors.171 Subsection (b) discusses cases in which the initial charges were 
felonies.172 
a. Misdemeanor Offenses 
The racial disparities in charge reduction rates identified above were 
mainly driven by cases in which a misdemeanor crime was the top charge. In 
this set of cases, white defendants were 45.1% more likely than black defend-
ants to see their top charge dropped or reduced.173 Such charge reductions at the 
misdemeanor level can be especially valuable to a defendant to the extent that 
these may eliminate the possibility of a misdemeanor conviction (thus preclud-
ing the possibility of incarceration) either by the dismissal of all charges or their 
reduction to a lesser offense that does not carry a prison sentence (such as a 
forfeiture).174 To analyze differences in this particular outcome, we can con-
struct a variable that measures whether the charges that carry a potential prison 
or jail sentence are dismissed, dropped or reduced to a charge that does not car-
                                                                                                                           
 167 A total of 725 cases fall into one of these categories. 
 168 In these analyses, there are 26,246 cases involving white defendants and 18,167 cases 
involving black defendants. Of the remaining 3,188 cases, 2,086 involve Hispanic defendants and 
1,102 involve defendants of other races or for which race information was unavailable. The charge 
reduction rates for these two groups are 45.11% and 44.19%, respectively. 
 169 This relative difference is calculated by dividing the difference in charge reduction rates 
between white and black defendants (9.42% points) by the charge reduction rates of black defend-
ants (35.98% points), which yields 26.18%. 
 170 As in the discussion of sentencing disparities, these initial analyses explore differences in 
raw averages. Similar analyses controlling for a variety of factors are discussed later. See infra 
notes 210–230 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 173–186 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 187–195 and accompanying text. 
 173 See infra note 176 and accompanying text (Table 3, panel A, column (1)). The correspond-
ing charge reduction rates are 44.82% for white defendants and 30.89% for black defendants, 
which yields a difference of 13.93%. 
 174 For instance, of the 12,997 cases in the database in which a defendant was convicted of a 
crime that carries no sentence or in which the defendant was acquitted, 64.27% involve white 
defendants, while only 27.77% involved black defendants. 
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ry a potential prison or jail sentence. Using this outcome variable reveals a 
slightly greater disparity—white defendants are 74.72% more likely than black 
defendants to see all misdemeanor charges carrying a potential imprisonment 
sentence dropped, dismissed or amended to lesser charges.175 
Table 3. Pre-Sentencing Outcomes & Crime Severity176 
 
Panel A – All Cases 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Misdemeanors Felonies 
 
Top Charge 
Dropped or 
Amended 
Charges with 
Sentences 
Dropped or 
Dismissed 
Top Charge 
Dropped or 
Amended 
Felony Charg-
es Dropped or 
Dismissed 
White 44.82% 36.97% 46.53% 41.71% 
Black 30.89% 21.16% 43.9% 36.41% 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Panel B – Felony Cases by Severity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Top Charge 5 Years or Less 
Top Charge More Than 5 
Years 
 
Top Charge 
Dropped or 
Amended 
Felony Charges 
Dropped or 
Dismissed 
Top Charge 
Dropped or 
Amended 
Felony Charg-
es Dropped or 
Dismissed 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See infra note 176 and accompanying text (Table 3, panel A, column (2)). The correspond-
ing outcomes are 36.97% for white defendants and 21.16% for black defendants, a difference of 
15.81%. 
 176 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: Col-
umns (1) and (3) of both panels present the percentage of cases in which the initial top charge was 
dropped, amended to a lower charge or dismissed. Column (2) in Panel A presents the percentage 
of cases in which all charges carrying a potential sentence were dropped, amended to a charge 
carrying no sentence, or dismissed. Column (2) of Panel B and column (4) in both panels presents 
the percentage of cases in which all initial felony charges were dropped, amended to misdemeanor 
charges or dismissed. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A include all cases in which the top initial 
charge was a misdemeanor. Columns (3) and (4) of Panel A include all the cases in which the top 
initial charge was a felony. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B include felony cases in which the top 
charge carried a potential sentence of 5 years or less, while columns (3) and (4) include felony 
cases in which the top charge carried a potential sentence longer than 5 years. 
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White 49.83% 49.63% 45.35% 38.9% 
Black 39.87% 39.55% 44.99% 35.57% 
          
The impact of a misdemeanor conviction on a defendant’s life should 
not be understated. Although certainly less severe than felony convictions, 
misdemeanor convictions can carry major consequences for individuals. For 
one, a defendant can be incarcerated, even if it is not for a long period of 
time.177 Recall that not only are black defendants originally charged with 
misdemeanors more likely to be convicted of a misdemeanor than white 
defendants,178 but black defendants convicted of a misdemeanor are more 
likely to be punished by incarceration than white defendants convicted of a 
misdemeanor.179 Even defendants receiving a fine or probation as punish-
ment for their misdemeanor convictions are likely to be eventually impris-
oned if they are unable to pay their fines or if they violate a condition of 
their probation.180 Misdemeanor convictions can also affect a person’s fu-
ture interaction with the criminal justice process and other public institu-
tions. A misdemeanor conviction becomes part of the defendant’s criminal 
history and can be considered by a judge in a future case when determining 
bail and sentencing.181 Additionally, there can also be collateral conse-
                                                                                                                           
 177 In this dataset those incarcerated following a misdemeanor conviction receive sentences 
that are on average 2.31 months long. This average is 2.47 months for black defendants and 2.13 
for white defendants. If we include cases with zero sentences, the average incarceration period for 
the entire sample is 0.97 months. For black defendants, the average incarceration length in cases 
involving misdemeanor convictions (including zero sentences) is 1.32 months, while for white 
defendants it is 0.72 months. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (Table 1, panel C, col-
umn (2)). 
 178 See supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text. Additionally, black defendants convict-
ed of misdemeanors receive longer sentences than white defendants. See supra note 177. 
 180 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1081–82 
(2015) [hereinafter Natapoff, Decriminalization]; see also KAREN DOLAN & JODI L. CARR, INST. 
POL’Y STUD., THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POV-
ERTY 11 (Mar. 2015), https://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-
Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/UGY8-4M7G] (noting that in many jurisdictions, low-income individuals 
are “facing harsher outcomes linked to their inability to pay fines,” including incarceration); Lisa 
Riordan Seville & Hannah Rappleye, Sentenced to Debt: Some Tossed in Prison over Unpaid Fines, 
NBC NEWS (May 27, 2013, 3:43 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/sentenced-
debt-some-tossed-prison-over-unpaid-fines-v18380470 [http://perma.cc/5QXJ-UDVP] (discussing a 
rising trend involving local governments imprisoning individuals for failure to pay fines); Joseph 
Shapiro, Jail Time for Unpaid Court Fines and Fees Can Create Cycle of Poverty, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/02/09/384968360/
jail-time-for-unpaid-court-fines-and-fees-can-create-cycle-of-poverty [http://perma.cc/3DRM-T22S] 
(providing an example of an individual that was incarcerated for being unable to pay a fine). 
 181 Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 758 
(2017). 
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quences for a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor offense, such as loss of 
eligibility for student loan assistance or public housing.182 
Even if the penalties (and the associated disparities) are small in magni-
tude on a case-by-case basis, in the aggregate they can be quite substantial. 
Misdemeanors comprise the vast majority of criminal cases and for most in-
dividuals represent the first point of contact with the criminal justice pro-
cess.183 Despite (and perhaps due to) their sheer volume, the criminal justice 
system provides fewer protections for defendants in misdemeanor cases than 
felony cases.184 This creates a system with lower evidentiary standards, prone 
to higher rates of wrongful convictions and where appellate review and scru-
tiny is limited.185 One commentator argues it is in these misdemeanor cases 
where black individuals begin to be labeled as criminals.186 
b. Felony Offenses 
In cases in which the defendant received at least one initial felony 
charge, white defendants received charge reductions 5.99% more often than 
black defendants.187 Charge reductions at the felony level can be valuable to 
defendants not just because of the corresponding reduction in the maximum 
possible sentence they may receive later in the process, but also because of 
the possibility of having felony charges reduced to misdemeanor charges.188 
To capture differences in this specific outcome, we can calculate the rate at 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See id. at 763–66. 
 183 See Natapoff, Decriminalization, supra note 180, at 1063 (noting that misdemeanors com-
prise “around eighty percent of most state dockets” and that the “misdemeanor process is the 
gateway to the criminal system”). 
 184 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter Natapoff, Misdemeanors] (explaining that processes used for misdemeanor cases, likely due to 
their routine and ubiquitous nature, typically function with fewer due process protections than 
felony cases). 
 185 See id. at 1317 (“[T]he lack of procedural integrity in petty offense processing generates 
wrongful convictions.”); Natapoff, Decriminalization, supra note 180, at 1063–64 (“Unlike its 
felony counterpart, the misdemeanor arena is severely underregulated, informal, and sloppy.”); 
Joe, supra note 181, at 761 (“Misdemeanor convictions also receive less rigorous appellate review 
than felony convictions . . . .”). 
 186 See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 184, at 1368 (arguing misdemeanors generate 
“high-volume convictions of questionable evidentiary validity,” primarily against young black 
men, which then label those convicted as criminals in any future interaction with the criminal 
justice process). 
 187 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (Table 3, panel A, column (3)). White defend-
ants in felony cases receive a charge reduction in 46.53% of the cases, which is 2.63% higher than 
the charge reduction rate for black defendants, 43.9%. 
 188 See Wright & Engen, supra note 49, at 9 (noting that the reduction of felony charges to 
misdemeanors is especially consequential because it reduces punishment and offender’s criminal 
history). 
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which defendants see all their felony charges dropped, dismissed or amend-
ed to a misdemeanor charge.189 Examining this outcome variable yields 
similar results, though the disparities are a bit greater—white defendants 
see their felony charges dropped or reduced into a misdemeanor charge 
14.56% more often than black defendants.190 
Felony crimes as a class include a very diverse group of offenses. 
Some felonies are associated with penalties of just over a year in prison, 
whereas others carry potential sentences of up to sixty years or even life 
imprisonment. It is possible that racial disparities in charge reductions in 
felony cases may differ depending on the severity of the crime. The fact that 
racial disparities in overall reduction rates are lower than racial disparities 
in the rate at which defendants see their felony charges reduced to misde-
meanor charges suggests that there might be such difference in charge re-
duction rates within classes of felonies—i.e., that white defendants are more 
likely to be treated more favorably than black defendants in cases that in-
volve low-level felonies, those “nearer” to the misdemeanor level. To ex-
plore these differences more closely, we can divide felony cases into two 
groups according to the severity of the crime involved—whether the maxi-
mum statutory sentence corresponding to the principal charge is (i) greater 
than 5 years or (ii) 5 years or lower.191 
In cases where defendants were initially charged with a less severe fel-
ony offense, white defendants received a charge reduction 49.83% of the 
time whereas black defendants received a charge reduction 39.87% of the 
time.192 The difference in charge reduction rates between white and black 
defendants, 9.96%, represents 24.98% of the charge reduction for black de-
fendants.193 On the other hand, there are no differences in charge reduction 
rates between white and black defendants in cases involving more serious 
initial felony charges. In this subset of cases, white defendants received a 
charge reduction 45.35% of the time, whereas black defendants did so 
                                                                                                                           
 189 This metric only takes into account cases in which at least one of the original charges 
involved a felony crime. 
 190 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (Table 3, panel A, column (4)). The corre-
sponding outcomes are 41.71% for white defendants and 36.41% for black defendants, a differ-
ence of 5.3%. 
 191 This threshold is based on the maximum statutory sentence for the lowest felony class in 
effect during the earlier years of the dataset. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (Table 3, panel B, column (1)). 
 193 As a result, white defendants are 25.49% more likely than black defendants to see their 
initial felony charges dropped to misdemeanor (or even lesser) charges. See supra note 176 and 
accompanying text (Table 3, panel B, column (2)). White defendants see their felony charges 
dropped to a misdemeanor, or entirely dropped, 49.63% of the time. For black defendants, this 
happened 39.55% of the time, a difference of 10.08%. 
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44.99% of the time, a negligible and statistically insignificant difference.194 
Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration of the relationship between racial 
disparities in charge reduction rates and the severity of the top initial 
charge. The role of the severity of the offense in mediating plea-bargaining 
disparities is examined later in the Article.195 
Figure 1. Relative Disparities in Charge Reduction by Severity of Crime196 
 
 
2. Charge Reductions and Defendant’s Criminal History 
Along similar lines, we can divide cases according to the other factor 
that, together with the severity of the crime, is often determinative of the 
sentence received by a defendant—the defendant’s criminal history. In the 
analyses that follow we measure the defendant’s criminal history by the 
number of prior convictions, or more specifically, whether or not a defend-
ant had a prior conviction.197 Dividing the sample along this dimension re-
veals striking differences in plea-bargaining outcomes between black and 
white defendants in cases involving both misdemeanor and felony charges. 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (Table 3, panel B, column (3)). The p-value 
from a two-tailed test that the charge reduction for black and white defendants is equal is 0.6613. 
White defendants see their felony charges dropped to a misdemeanor, or entirely dropped, 38.9% 
of the time. For black defendants, this happened 35.57% of the time, a difference of 3.33%. See 
supra note 176 and accompanying text (Table 3, panel B, column (4)). 
 195 See infra notes 260–267 and accompanying text. 
 196 This Figure is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. 
 197 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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White defendants with no prior convictions receive charge reductions in 
63.91% of the cases, 13.25% higher than the rate of charge reductions for 
black defendants with no prior convictions, 50.66%.198 In other words, white 
defendants with no prior convictions are over twenty-five percent more likely 
than black defendants to receive a charge reduction. On the other hand, the 
charge reduction rates for white and black defendants with at least one prior 
conviction are nearly identical—30.3% and 30%, respectively.199 Figure 2 
presents a graphical illustration of this relationship between racial disparities 
in charge reduction rates and defendants’ criminal histories. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 198 This difference in charge reduction rates between white and black defendants with no prior 
convictions is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 199 This difference in charge reduction rates between white and black defendants with prior 
convictions is not statistically significant at conventional levels (the p-value from a two-tailed test 
that the charge reduction for black and white defendants with prior conviction is equal is 0.6740). 
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Figure 2. Relative Racial Disparities in Charge Reduction by  
Defendant’s Criminal History200 
 
As shown in Table 4, this pattern is consistent across both felonies and 
misdemeanors. White defendants charged with misdemeanors who have no 
prior criminal history are 33.06% more likely than similarly situated black 
defendant to see their top charges dropped or reduced.201 As a result, these 
white defendants are 46.27% more likely than black defendants to have all 
misdemeanor charges carrying a potential sentence dropped or reduced to 
charges that carry no potential imprisonment.202 Differences in charge re-
duction rates between white and black defendants in misdemeanor cases are 
substantially smaller when we only consider defendants who have at least 
one prior conviction. In these cases, 26.51% of white defendants receive a 
charge reduction, whereas black defendants do only 23.15% of the time.203 
                                                                                                                           
 200 This Figure is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. 
 201 See infra note 204 and accompanying text (Table 4, panel A, column (1)). In this subset of 
cases white defendants see their top charges reduced 63.99% of the time, while black defendants 
see their top charges dropped 48.09% of the time. The difference between the two groups—
15.9%—is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 202 See infra note 204 and accompanying text (Table 4, panel A, column (2)). White defend-
ants achieve this plea-bargaining outcome 57.6% of the time, while black defendants do so 
39.38% of the time. The difference between the two groups—18.22%—is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. 
 203 See infra note 204 and accompanying text (Table 4, panel A, column (3)). Additionally, 
black and white defendants see their misdemeanor charges dropped or reduced to charges carrying 
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Table 4. Pre-Sentencing Outcomes & Criminal History204 
Panel A – Misdemeanor Cases 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
No Prior Convictions Prior Convictions 
 
Top Charge 
Dropped or 
Amended 
Charges with 
Sentences 
Dropped or Dis-
missed 
Top Charge 
Dropped or 
Amended 
Charges with 
Sentences 
Dropped or Dis-
missed 
White 63.99% 57.60% 26.51% 16.51% 
Black 48.09% 39.38% 23.15% 12.96% 
     Panel B – Felony Cases 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
No Prior Convictions Prior Convictions 
 
Top Charge 
Dropped or 
Amended 
Felony Charges 
Dropped or Dis-
missed 
Top Charge 
Dropped or 
Amended 
Felony Charges 
Dropped or Dis-
missed 
White 63.67% 58.96% 36.36% 31.47% 
Black 55.47% 48.33% 39.89% 31.29% 
          
 
White defendants with no prior convictions see their top felony charg-
es reduced 63.67% of the time, whereas black defendants do so 55.47% of 
time.205 Similarly, white defendants see all their felony charges dropped to a 
misdemeanor or lesser charge (or dropped entirely) in 59.96% of the cases, 
whereas for black defendants with no prior criminal history this favorable 
                                                                                                                           
no potential imprisonment at similar rates, 12.96% and 16.51%, respectively. See infra note 204 
and accompanying text (Table 4, panel A, column (4)). 
 204 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: Col-
umns (1) and (3) of all panels present the percentage of cases in which the initial top charge was 
dropped, amended to a lower charge or dismissed. Columns (2) and (4) in Panel A present the 
percentage of cases in which all charges carrying a potential sentence were dropped, amended to 
charges carrying no sentence, or dismissed. Columns (2) and (4) in Panel B present the percentage 
of cases in which all initial felony charges were dropped, amended to misdemeanor charges or 
dismissed. Panel A includes all cases in which the top charge was a misdemeanor, while Panel B 
includes all cases in which the top charge was a felony. Columns (1) and (2) in each panel restrict 
the sample to cases in which the defendant had no prior convictions, while columns (3) and (4) 
restrict the sample to cases in which the defendant had at least a prior conviction. 
 205 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (Table 4, panel B, column (1)). This difference 
of 8.2% represents 14.78% of the charge reduction rate for black defendants and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
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outcome occurs 48.33% of the time.206 The results are entirely different if 
we consider those defendants with a prior criminal history. In this subset of 
cases, black defendants are marginally more likely than white defendants to 
see their top felony charges reduced207 and see their felony charges dropped 
to a misdemeanor charge (or dropped entirely).208 The role of defendants’ 
criminal histories in mediating plea-bargaining disparities is examined later 
in the Article. 209 
3. Controlling for Defendant and Crime Characteristics 
The analyses of plea-bargaining outcomes presented thus far have cen-
tered on the comparison of raw averages across black and white defendants 
without controlling for various case and defendant characteristics that may 
play a role in determining plea-bargaining outcomes and that may, at the 
same time, also correlate with race. One concern is that the racial disparities 
documented earlier are driven by systematic differences in these other vari-
ables, an issue explored earlier as part of the discussion of sentencing dis-
parities.210 
To assess racial disparities in the plea-bargaining process more rigor-
ously, we can estimate a series of probit models in which the outcome vari-
able is a binary indicator variable equal to 1 if the top charge in a case was 
reduced and 0 if the top charge was not reduced.211 The explanatory varia-
bles in these models are similar to those described for specification (1) 
above,212 including certain defendant characteristics (such as defendant’s 
age, gender and criminal history) and case characteristics (such as the exist-
ence of additional initial charges, a set of fixed effects for the statutory max-
                                                                                                                           
 206 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (Table 4, panel B, column (2)). This difference 
of 10.63% represents 21.99% of the charge reduction rate for black defendants and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 207 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (Table 4, panel B, column (3)). The rate of 
charge reduction for white defendants with prior convictions is 36.36%, which is 3.53% lower 
than the charge reduction rate for black defendants, 39.89%. This difference represents 9.7% of 
the charge reduction rate for white defendants and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 208 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (Table 4, panel B, column (4)). The difference 
here is even smaller—black defendants are 0.57% less likely to see their felony charges converted 
to misdemeanor charges or dropped entirely. For white defendants, this outcome takes place 
31.47% of the time, while for black defendants it does 31.29% of the time. The difference between 
these two groups is not statistically significant 
 209 See infra notes 260–267 and accompanying text. 
 210 See supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text. 
 211 For a description of the probit model and the interpretation of its results, see supra notes 
147–148. Estimating the model as a linear probability model using an ordinary least squares re-
gression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors yields similar results. 
 212 See supra notes 135–142 and accompanying text. 
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imum sentence corresponding to the principal initial charge (i.e., the charge 
carrying the highest possible sentence), the type of crime corresponding to 
the principal initial charge,213 and the year the case was filed). Estimating 
these models allows us to focus on the effect of race on the plea-bargaining 
process after controlling for these additional factors. The results of these 
models are presented in Table 5 below.214 
  
                                                                                                                           
 213 This set of crime categories is based on the corresponding chapter of the Wisconsin crimi-
nal code. For a list of these categories see supra note 144 and accompanying text (Table 2). One 
concern is that these categories are too broad, raising the possibility that the race of the defendant 
may be correlated with the severity of the crime within each category (e.g., black defendants may 
be more likely to be charged with first degree robberies, while white defendants are more likely to 
be charged with lesser degrees of that crime). Although the empirical model also controls for 
crime class and severity (i.e., with fixed effects based on the statutory maximum sentence), these 
might not fully address this problem. As a robustness check, one can create alternative crime con-
trols based on the interaction of the type of crime (e.g., robbery) and the class of the offense (e.g., 
720, 480, and 180 months). This measure, for example, would yield three different groups for 
robbery crimes, each associated with a different class (or statutory maximum). Including these 
alternative crime controls instead of the two complementary sets of controls described above does 
not affect the results described below. See infra notes 216 and 223; Tables 3 and 4. 
 214 To facilitate the interpretation of these results, Table 5 shows the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables. See infra note 215 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 147–148 
and accompanying text. The results are nearly identical if we use the more granular crime fixed 
effects described in note 213, supra. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (Table 3). 
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Table 5. Charge Reduction Rates & Crime Severity215 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Cases 
Misd. Cas-
es 
Felony Cases 
  All Low High 
Black -0.066*** -0.082*** -0.039*** -0.109*** -0.018* 
 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.018] [0.010] 
Other -0.036*** -0.045*** -0.002 -0.039 0.011 
 
[0.010] [0.012] [0.019] [0.039] [0.022] 
Female 0.060*** 0.076*** 0.018 0.016 0.019 
 
[0.006] [0.008] [0.011] [0.025] [0.013] 
Age 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.002* 0.000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Prior (1) -0.242*** -0.267*** -0.163*** -0.174*** -0.160*** 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.012] [0.023] [0.014] 
Prior (2+) -0.326*** -0.352*** -0.249*** -0.291*** -0.233*** 
 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.010] [0.018] [0.011] 
ConcChrg -0.049 -0.015** -0.109*** -0.203*** -0.096*** 
 
[0.048] [0.007] [0.000] [0.025] [0.010] 
 
  
 
  
  Obs. 47,507 30,441 17,052 4,251 12,793 
Mean 0.418 0.397 0.454 0.450 0.455 
            
 
Once again, the coefficient of interest is the indicator variable Black. 
The results are consistent with those described above, evidencing substan-
tial racial disparities in charge reduction rates, with such disparities being 
                                                                                                                           
 215 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: Ro-
bust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
This table presents the marginal effects from probit models in which the outcome variable is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the initial top charge in a case was dropped, amended to a lesser 
charge or dismissed. Column (1) includes all cases, column (2) includes all misdemeanor cases 
and column (3) include all felony cases. Columns (4) and (5) divide felony cases based on whether 
the principal charge carried a potential sentence of (i) 5 years or less or (ii) more than 5 years, 
respectively. For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see infra note 304 and ac-
companying text (Appendix 1: Table 1). All regressions include a set of crime class fixed effects, 
a set of crime type fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. 
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significantly lower in cases involving more severe felonies. For example, 
the coefficient on Black for misdemeanor cases is -0.082.216 This means that 
black defendants are 8.2% less likely than white defendants to see their top 
charge reduced, a difference that represents 20.65% of the average rate of 
top charge reduction in misdemeanor cases.217 Similarly, for cases involving 
less serious felonies,218 the coefficient on Black is -0.109, which represents 
22.22% of the charge reduction rate in these felony cases.219 On the other 
hand, for cases involving serious felonies,220 the coefficient on Black is -
0.018, which represents just 3.96% of the corresponding average out-
come.221 
Table 6 presents the results of similar probit models estimated on sepa-
rate subsets of the data based on defendants’ criminal histories.222 The re-
sults are consistent with those described earlier—there are substantial dis-
parities in the rate of charge reductions received by white and black defend-
ants who have no prior criminal records, but the disparities between these 
two groups decrease significantly when we focus solely on defendants with 
at least one prior conviction. This is true for cases in which the top charge 
was a misdemeanor223 and in cases in which the top charge was a felony, as 
seen below.224 
                                                                                                                           
 216 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (Table 5, column (2)). 
 217 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (Table 5, column (2)). 
 218 These are felonies that carry a maximum statutory sentence of five years or less. See supra 
note 192. 
 219 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (Table 5, column (4)). 
 220 These are felonies that carry a maximum statutory sentence of more than five years. See 
supra note 192. 
 221 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (Table 5, column (5)). 
 222 The results are nearly identical if we use the more granular crime fixed effects described in 
note 213, supra. See infra note 307 and accompanying text (Appendix 4: Table 4). 
 223 Black defendants with no prior convictions who are initially charged with misdemeanors 
are 16.2% less likely than white defendants to receive a charge reduction. See infra note 225 and 
accompanying text (Table 6, column (3)). The coefficient on Black represents 27.22% of the aver-
age reduction rate in this sample of cases. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (Table 6, 
column (3)). On the other hand, when we look at misdemeanor cases in which the defendant had 
prior convictions, the coefficient on Black is smaller (-0.019) and represents 6.3% of the mean 
outcome. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (Table 6, column (4)). 
 224 In felony cases, black defendants with no prior convictions are 10.1% less likely than 
white defendants to obtain a charge reduction. The coefficient on Black represents 16.69% of the 
average rate in the sample. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (Table 6, column (5)). How-
ever, there is no statistically significant difference between the rates of charge reduction for black 
and white defendants with prior criminal history. The coefficient on Black is small (0.012) and 
represents 3.16% of the mean outcome. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (Table 6, col-
umn (6)). 
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Table 6. Charge Reduction Rates & Criminal History225 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Cases Misdemeanor Cases Felony Cases 
  No Prior Prior No Prior Prior No Prior Prior 
Black -0.143*** -0.019*** -0.162*** -0.023*** -0.101*** -0.012 
 
[0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.016] [0.010] 
Other -0.029** -0.059*** -0.033** -0.075*** 0.015 -0.021 
 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.016] [0.014] [0.026] [0.025] 
Female 0.093*** 0.014* 0.107*** 0.025*** 0.043*** -0.005 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.017] [0.014] 
Age 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*** -0.001 0.001 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Prior (2+)   -0.073
*** 
 
-0.063***   -0.086
*** 
   [0.007] 
 
[0.008]   [0.012] 
ConcChrg -0.009 -0.059 -0.058*** 0.023*** -0.146*** -0.085*** 
 
[0.088] [0.051] [0.011] [0.008] [0.016] [0.011] 
 
    
  
  
 Obs. 18,831 28,676 13,169 17,270 5,655 11,397 
Mean 0.598 0.300 0.595 0.247 0.605 0.380 
              
 Finally, Table 7 presents the estimates of similar probit models using 
our two alternative outcome variables that measure the rates at which (i) 
defendants charged with misdemeanors are ultimately convicted of crimes 
that carry no possible incarceration and (ii) defendants charged with felo-
                                                                                                                           
 225 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: Ro-
bust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
This table presents the marginal effects from the series of probit models described next. The out-
come variable in columns (1)–(6) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the initial top charge in a 
case was dropped, amended to a lesser charge or dismissed. Columns (1)–(2) includes all cases, 
while columns (3)–(4) and (5)–(6) include all misdemeanor and felony cases, respectively. Col-
umns (1), (3) and (5) restrict the sample to cases in which the defendant had no prior convictions. 
Columns (2), (4) and (6) restrict the sample to cases in which the defendant had at least one prior 
conviction. For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see infra note 304 and ac-
companying text (Appendix 1: Table 1). All regressions include a set of crime class fixed effects, 
a set of crime type fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. 
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nies are ultimately convicted of a misdemeanor (or a lesser crime).226 The 
results confirm that the significant racial disparities in these alternative out-
comes discussed earlier are present even after controlling for various de-
fendant and crime characteristics.227 White defendants charged with misde-
meanors are more likely than black defendants to be ultimately convicted of 
crimes carrying no potential incarceration or have their charges dis-
missed.228 Similarly, white defendants charged with felonies are more likely 
than black defendants to be convicted of a misdemeanor or lesser charge.229 
As noted earlier, these disparities are mainly driven by cases involving de-
fendants with no prior convictions—if we focus on cases involving defend-
ants with prior convictions, racial disparities are substantially lower.230 
  
                                                                                                                           
 226 These outcome variables are constructed as follows: (a) an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
all charges carrying a potential jail or prison sentence were dropped or reduced to charges carrying 
no potential incarceration (misdemeanors cases) and (b) an indicator variable equal to 1 if all felo-
ny charges were dropped or reduced to misdemeanor (or lesser) charges (felony cases). 
 227 See supra notes 205–208 and accompanying text. 
 228 See infra note 231 and accompanying text (Table 7, column (1)). 
 229 These disparities are substantially greater in cases where a defendant is charged with less 
severe felonies (i.e., those carrying potential sentences of five years or less). See infra note 231 
and accompanying text (Table 7, columns (6)–(7)). 
 230 See infra note 231 and accompanying text (Table 7, columns (2)–(3) (misdemeanors) and 
Table 7, columns (4)–(5) (felonies)). 
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Table 7. Alternative Pre-Sentencing Outcomes231 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Misdemeanor Cases Felony Cases 
  All 
No Pri-
or 
Prior 
No Pri-
or 
Prior High Low 
Black -0.085*** -0.178*** -0.019*** -0.118*** -0.019** -0.031*** -0.105*** 
 
[0.006] [0.010] [0.005] [0.016] [0.009] [0.010] [0.018] 
Other -0.020* -0.016 -0.041*** 0.008 -0.032 -0.004 -0.035 
 
[0.010] [0.016] [0.011] [0.027] [0.023] [0.021] [0.037] 
Female 0.057*** 0.113*** -0.004 0.035** -0.000 0.015 0.013 
 
[0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.018] [0.013] [0.012] [0.024] 
Age 0.001*** -0.000 0.002*** -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002* 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Prior (1) -0.244***  0.052
*** 
  
-0.169*** -0.188*** 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.007] 
  
[0.012] [0.022] 
Prior -0.348***     -0.087
*** -0.257*** -0.311*** 
(2+) [0.005] 
 
   [0.012] [0.011] [0.018] 
ConcChrg -0.107*** -0.116*** -0.074** -0.254** -0.196*** -0.220*** -0.231*** 
 
[0.007] [0.011] [0.006] [0.016] [0.010] [0.009] [0.025] 
        
Obs. 30,433 13,164 17,231 5,651 11,375 12,779 4,235 
Mean 0.311 0.526 0.147 0.546 0.316 0.376 0.440 
               
                                                                                                                           
 231 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: 
Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%). This table presents the marginal effects from the series of probit models described next. The 
outcome variable in columns (1)–(3) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if all charges carrying a 
potential sentence were dropped, amended to a charge carrying no sentence, or dismissed. The 
outcome variable in columns (4)–(7) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if all initial felony charges 
were dropped, amended to misdemeanor charges, or dismissed. Column (1) includes all misde-
meanor cases, while columns (2) and (3) include misdemeanor cases in which the defendant had 
no prior conviction and in which the defendant had at least one prior conviction, respectively. 
Columns (4) and (5) include all felony cases in which the defendant had no prior conviction and in 
which the defendant had a prior conviction, respectively. Columns (6) and (7) divide felony cases 
based on whether the principal charge carried a potential sentence of 5 years or less or more than 5 
years. For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see infra note 304 and accompany-
ing text (Appendix 1: Table 1). All regressions include a set of crime class fixed effects, a set of 
crime type fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. 
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4. The Role of Prosecuting and Defense Attorneys 
The results presented thus far indicate that white defendants are more 
likely than black defendants to see their initial charges reduced as part of 
the plea-bargaining process.232 This allows white defendants initially 
charged with a felony to avoid a felony conviction more often than black 
defendants.233 It also allows white defendants originally charged with a 
misdemeanor to avoid being convicted of a crime that carries a potential 
imprisonment sentence at a rate higher than black defendants.234 These re-
sults are robust to the inclusion of variables controlling for various defend-
ant and crime characteristics.235 
a. Differences in Prosecuting Attorneys 
One possible explanation relates to the identity of the prosecuting at-
torney making the decision whether or not to reduce the principal charge in 
a given case. If prosecutors differ in their willingness to agree to a charge 
reduction and cases are not allocated randomly across prosecutors, one may 
be concerned that the racial disparities documented earlier are the result of 
the assignment of cases involving black defendants to prosecutors that are 
less likely to agree to reduce charges. If this is true, then the coefficient on 
the black indicator variable would be capturing some of these systematic 
differences across prosecutors, thus artificially inflating the magnitude of 
the observed racial disparities.236 
To address these concerns, we can use the identity of the prosecuting 
attorney, which the CCAP database provides for all but 211 of the 47,601 
cases considered in the analyses presented earlier in this section. Thirty-
three prosecutors appear in at least one hundred cases (and in a total of 
47,012 cases). Using this information, we can construct thirty-five indicator 
variables: (i) one indicator variable for each of the thirty-three prosecutors 
that appear in at least one hundred cases; (ii) one indicator variable for cas-
es involving prosecutors that appeared less than 100 times in the dataset; 
and (iii) one indicator variable for cases in which the identity of the prose-
cutor was not available. To verify whether systematic differences in the 
identity of the prosecutor are driving the racial disparities in plea-bargaining 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See supra notes 165–172 and accompanying text. 
 233 See supra notes 187–195 and accompanying text. 
 234 See supra notes 173–186 and accompanying text. 
 235 See supra notes 210–230 and accompanying text. 
 236 In addition, cases assigned to the same prosecutor are not necessarily independent of one 
another, which can result in artificially deflated standard errors that make results appear statistical-
ly significant when they might not be. 
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outcomes documented earlier, the specifications presented in Table 5 (which 
divided cases along charge severity)237 and Table 6 (which divided cases 
along defendant criminal history)238 can be re-estimated including this set of 
thirty-five prosecuting attorney fixed-effects. The results for these specifica-
tions are presented in Table 8.239 
Table 8. Analyses Including Prosecuting Attorney Fixed Effects240 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Misdemeanors 
Low Level 
Felonies 
High Lev-
el Felo-
nies 
No Prior 
Convictions 
Prior Con-
victions 
Black -0.083*** -0.108*** -0.021* -0.143*** -0.019*** 
 
[0.006] [0.020] [0.012] [0.009] [0.007] 
Other -0.045*** -0.041 0.018 -0.029* -0.054*** 
 
[0.009] [0.032] [0.023] [0.0170] [0.014] 
Female 0.077*** 0.018 0.031* 0.096*** 0.019** 
 
[0.009] [0.022] [0.017] [0.013] [0.009] 
Age 0.002*** 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Prior (1) -0.267*** -0.183*** -0.160*** 
 
0.073*** 
 
[0.011] [0.024] [0.017] 
 
[0.009] 
                                                                                                                           
 237 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (Table 5); see also supra notes 210–221 and 
accompanying text. 
 238 See supra note 225 and accompanying text (Table 6); see also supra notes 222–224 and 
accompanying text. 
 239 To correct for the fact that cases managed by the same prosecutor are not independent 
from one another, standard errors are clustered at the prosecutor level. 
 240 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: 
Robust standard errors clustered at the prosecuting attorney level in brackets (* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). This table presents the marginal effects from probit 
models in which the outcome variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the initial top charge in 
a case was dropped, amended to a lesser charge or dismissed. Column (1) includes all misde-
meanor cases. Column (2) includes felony cases in which the principal charge carried a potential 
sentence of 5 years or less, while column (3) includes felony cases in which the principal charge 
carried a potential sentence of more than 5 years. Columns (4) and (5) include all cases in which 
the defendant had no prior convictions and in which the defendant had at least one prior convic-
tion, respectively. For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see infra note 304 and 
accompanying text (Appendix 1: Table 1). All regressions include a set of crime class fixed ef-
fects, a set of crime type fixed effects, a set of year fixed effects and a set of prosecuting attorney 
fixed effects (see supra notes 237–239 and accompanying text). 
2018] Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining 1233 
Prior (2+) -0.351*** -0.296*** -0.232*** 
 
  
 
[0.008] [0.030] [0.015] 
 
  
ConcChrg -0.018** -0.213*** -0.094*** 0.006 -0.056 
 
[0.009] [0.024] [0.017] [0.086] [0.035] 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Obs. 30,441 4,251 12,793 18,831 28,676 
Mean 0.397 0.450 0.455 0.598 0.300 
            
 
In misdemeanor cases, black defendants are 8.3% less likely than 
white defendants to receive a charge reduction, which is virtually identical 
to the difference documented in the specifications excluding the indicator 
variables (8.2%).241 In cases involving low-level felonies, black defendants 
are 10.8% less likely than white defendants to receive a charge reduction, 
nearly identical to the difference documented earlier in earlier analyses 
(10.9%).242 In cases involving high level felonies, black defendants are 
2.1% less likely than white defendants to receive a charge reduction, a rate 
differential similar to that documented earlier (1.8%).243 Results are also 
consistent when dividing cases based on the criminal history of the defend-
ant. Black defendants with no prior convictions are 14.3% less likely than 
white defendants to receive a charge reduction, which is identical to the ear-
lier estimate.244 Finally, including these prosecutor fixed effects confirms 
that differences in charge reduction rates between white and black defend-
ants that have at least one prior conviction are smaller (1.9%).245 
b. Differences in Attorney Quality 
Another possible explanation for the racial disparities in plea-
bargaining outcomes documented earlier is that there are systematic differ-
ences in the quality of the legal representation of black and white defend-
ants. If more qualified and experienced attorneys negotiate superior terms 
                                                                                                                           
 241 See infra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (1)); supra note 215 and ac-
companying text (Table 5, column (2)). 
 242 See infra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (2)); supra note 215 and ac-
companying text (Table 5, column (4)). 
 243 See infra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (3)); supra note 215 and ac-
companying text (Table 5, column (5)). 
 244 See infra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (4)); supra note 225 and ac-
companying text (Table 6, column (1)). 
 245 See infra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (5)); supra note 225 and ac-
companying text (Table 6, column (2)). 
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for their clients during the plea-bargaining process and white defendants 
have on average better legal representation than black defendants, then one 
would expect white defendants to have a higher rate of charge reductions 
than black defendants. In that case, the coefficient on the black indicator 
variable would be capturing differences in attorney quality, an omitted vari-
able problem.246 
The quality of legal representation for black defendants could be 
different from that of white defendants if the former largely have to rely on 
public defenders or legal defense funds and the latter generally are able to 
afford private defense attorneys.247 For this to be true, one would need to 
assume that privately retained attorneys outperform attorneys from the 
public defenders’s office or local legal defense funds. Nevertheless, the 
existing evidence does not necessarily support this assumption. Although 
more experienced counsel seem to obtain better sentencing outcomes for 
their clients,248 studies that have examined how public defenders perform 
relative to private counsel have reached inconsistent conclusions.249 
The dataset allows us to partially rule out the possibility that systemat-
ic differences in legal representation between white and black defendants 
are driving the observed disparities. The name of the defense attorney is 
                                                                                                                           
 246 If a relevant factor is omitted from a multivariate regression analysis, the econometric model 
may compensate for this omission by giving more weight (i.e., ascribing a higher explanatory value) 
to a variable that is included in the analysis and correlated with the missing variable. This is known 
as the omitted variable bias problem. For a discussion of this issue see WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 
142, at 96–97. 
 247 See Schanzenbach, supra note 35 at 63 (explaining “both income and assets are determi-
nants of quality of legal counsel and hence will play a role in sentencing, offense level determina-
tion, and probability of a downward departure”). 
 248 See David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case 
Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1172–73 (2007) (finding that 
defendants represented by more experienced public defenders are less likely to plead to the most 
serious charge, are less likely to be incarcerated, and are more likely to receive lower sentences). 
 249 See Nadine Frederique et al., What Is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent Defense 
Nationwide? A Brief Overview and Suggestions for Future Research, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1317, 1327 
(2015) (“Several studies found that private attorneys are able to obtain better sentencing outcomes 
for their clients when compared to public counsel. However, a competing line of research noted 
that public defender systems are able to achieve very similar outcomes to private attorneys.”). 
Compare Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-
Selection by the “Marginally Indigent,” 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 230 (2005) (finding that 
“public defenders achieved worse sentence outcomes for their clients than private defense coun-
sel”), with Abrams & Yoon, supra note 248, at 1172–73 (finding that experienced public defend-
ers are more likely to achieve better results for their clients), Michael A. Roach, Indigent Defense 
Counsel, Attorney Quality, and Defendant Outcomes, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 577, 578 (2014) 
(finding that “assigned counsel generate significantly less favorable defendant outcomes than 
public defenders”), and Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent De-
fense Counsel 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007) (finding that 
public defenders outperform assigned private attorneys in federal criminal cases). 
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available for 42,951 of the 47,601 cases considered in the analyses in this 
section.250 Ninety defense attorneys appear in at least one hundred cases in 
the database and in the aggregate, comprise 36,270 total observations. Us-
ing this information, one can construct a series of (i) ninety indicator varia-
bles for each of these ninety defense attorneys; (ii) one indicator variable 
for the 6,681 cases involving attorneys that appear less than one hundred 
times; and (iii) one indicator variable for the 5,417 cases for which no de-
fense attorney information was available. To verify whether the identity of 
the defense attorney is driving the racial disparities in plea-bargaining out-
comes documented earlier, we can re-estimate the specifications presented 
in Table 5 (which divided cases along charge severity)251 and Table 6 
(which divided cases along defendant criminal history),252 but including the 
set of ninety-two defense attorney indicator variables described above. The 
results for these specifications are presented in Table 9 below. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 250 For cases involving more than one defense attorney, I selected the attorney who was active 
(i.e., had not withdrawn) as of the date in which the case was resolved. When more than one attor-
ney was active as of this date, I selected the attorney based on alphabetical ordering. In 2,281 of 
these 42,951 cases, only the attorney’s organization was available (the Legal Defense Program in 
1,850 cases and State Public Defender in 431 cases). I treated these organizations as the attorney 
of record. 
 251 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (Table 5); see also supra notes 210–221 and 
accompanying text. 
 252 See supra note 225 and accompanying text (Table 6); see also supra notes 222–224 and 
accompanying text. 
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Table 9. Analyses Including Defense Attorney Fixed Effects253 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Misdemea-
nors 
Low Level 
Felonies 
High Level 
Felonies 
No Prior 
Convictions 
Prior Con-
victions 
Black -0.053*** -0.087*** 0.003 -0.099*** -0.005 
 
[0.007] [0.019] [0.011] [0.009] [0.006] 
Other -0.026** -0.03 0.033 -0.006 -0.046*** 
 
[0.012] [0.042] [0.023] [0.014] [0.013] 
Female 0.089*** 0.037 0.031** 0.106*** 0.025*** 
 
[0.008] [0.026] [0.013] [0.008] [0.008] 
Age 0.001*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 0.002*** 
 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Prior (1) -0.258*** -0.176*** -0.152***     
 [0.007] [0.024] [0.014]     
Prior (2+) -0.333*** -0.277*** -0.219***   -0.067
*** 
 
[0.006] [0.019] [0.012]   [0.007] 
ConcChrg -0.014* 0.218*** 0.100*** -0.020 -0.063 
 
[0.007] [0.025] [0.010] [0.089] [0.051] 
 
          
Obs. 30,441 4,251 12,793 18,831 28,676 
Mean 0.397 0.450 0.455 0.598 0.300 
            
 
                                                                                                                           
 253 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: 
Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%). This table presents the marginal effects from probit models in which the outcome variable is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the initial top charge in a case was dropped, amended to a lesser 
charge or dismissed. Column (1) includes all misdemeanor cases. Column (2) includes felony 
cases in which the principal charge carried a potential sentence of 5 years or less, while column 
(3) includes felony cases in which the principal charge carried a potential sentence of more than 5 
years. Columns (4) and (5) include all cases in which the defendant had no prior convictions and 
in which the defendant had at least one prior conviction, respectively. For a description of the 
explanatory variables of interest see infra note 304 and accompanying text (Appendix 1: Table 1). 
All regressions include a set of crime class fixed effects, a set of crime type fixed effects, a set of 
year fixed effects and a set of defense attorney fixed effects (see supra notes 250–252 and accom-
panying text). 
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In misdemeanor cases, black defendants are 5.3% less likely than 
white defendants to receive a charge reduction.254 Although this difference 
is slightly lower than the difference when excluding the indicator variables 
(8.3%),255 it is still substantial, representing 13.35% of the average charge 
reduction rate in the sample. In cases involving low-level felonies, black 
defendants are 8.7% less likely than white defendants to receive a charge 
reduction, a difference representing 19.33% of the average rate in the sam-
ple.256 Consistent with the analyses presented earlier, there are no substan-
tial differences in charge reduction rates between black and white defend-
ants initially charged with high level felonies.257 
The results highlighting the mediating role of defendants’ criminal his-
tory in determining disparities in plea-bargaining outcomes are also robust 
to the inclusion of defense attorney fixed effects. Black defendants with no 
prior convictions are 9.9% less likely than white defendants to receive a 
charge reduction, a difference representing 16.56% of the average charge 
reduction rate in the sample.258 Additionally, including these attorney fixed 
effects confirms our earlier conclusion that there are no substantial differ-
ences in charge reduction rates between white and black defendants that 
have at least one prior conviction.259 
5. Race as a Proxy for Criminality 
A theory that seeks to explain the racial disparities in plea-bargaining 
outcomes documented earlier needs to account not just for differences in the 
average charge reduction rates for black and white defendants, but also for 
the cross-sectional variation in racial disparities documented earlier. For 
example, if race appears to matter in plea-bargaining because it serves as a 
proxy for some omitted variable, then the inclusion of such variable would 
need to explain (i) why black defendants fare worse than white defendants 
when they have no prior convictions, but fare as well as white defendants 
                                                                                                                           
 254 See supra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (1)). 
 255 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (Table 5, column (2)). 
 256 See supra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (2)). This difference is slight-
ly smaller than that documented earlier when the specifications did not include attorney fixed 
effects (i.e., 8.4%). See supra note 215 and accompanying text (Table 5, column (4)). 
 257 See supra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, columns (3)); supra note 215 and 
accompanying text (Table 5, column (5)). 
 258 See supra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (4)). The magnitude of this 
coefficient is slightly lower than our earlier estimate, 15.27% which represented 28.6% of the 
average outcomes in the sample. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (Table 6, column (1)). 
 259 See supra note 253 and accompanying text (Table 9, column (5)); supra note 225 and 
accompanying text (Table 6, column (2)). 
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when they have a prior conviction,260 and (ii) why black defendants fare 
worse than white defendants when they commit less severe crimes, but are 
treated more equally when they commit more severe crimes.261 
An explanation consistent with these two patterns is that the race of the 
defendant is subconsciously used by prosecutors as a proxy for a defend-
ant’s recidivism potential and dangerousness.262 Even though prosecutors 
may have more information than judges about the specifics of the crime, 
prosecutors cannot easily observe a defendant’s true type (for example, like-
lihood to recidivate and latent criminality) and may not have the time or 
resources to assess this thoroughly on a case-by-case basis before making 
charging and plea-bargaining decision.263 The use of race as a heuristic 
would explain the cross-sectional differences in racial disparities identified 
earlier. 
For example, defendants with a prior conviction have already proved 
their likelihood to recidivate, rendering heuristics less useful in the risk as-
sessment of that defendant.264 This could explain why disparities arise in the 
sample of defendants with no prior convictions (where race is perhaps being 
used as a proxy for recidivism) but not in the sample of defendants with 
prior convictions (where such heuristics are less useful).265 Similarly, the 
severity of the crime can affect the value of race as a proxy for a defend-
ant’s latent criminality and dangerousness. One who commits a serious fel-
ony crime has already proved that they are dangerous. Thus, in the sample 
of cases involving more severe crimes, race would be less valuable as a 
proxy for a person’s latent criminality. Nevertheless, in cases involving less 
severe crimes, it is harder to tell ex-ante how dangerous a person might ul-
timately be. Under these circumstances, prosecutors could be using a de-
fendant’s race as a proxy for an individual’s latent criminality.266 Consistent 
with this explanation, racial disparities are higher for cases involving less 
severe crimes, but virtually non-existent for those cases involving the most 
severe crimes.267 
                                                                                                                           
 260 See supra notes 197–209 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra notes 165–195 and accompanying text. 
 262 This connection of race and criminality may be conscious (i.e., statistical discrimination) 
or subconscious (i.e., implicit bias). See supra notes 42–45, 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 263 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 264 See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
 265 See supra notes 197–209 and accompanying text. 
 266 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 267 See supra notes 165–195 and accompanying text. 
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C. Racial Disparities in Initial Charging 
The analyses presented thus far have taken the prosecutors’ initial 
charging decisions at face value, without considering possible discriminato-
ry decisions against the defendant. As noted earlier, the decision whether to 
bring initial charges against an offender and which specific charges to file 
(given the particular characteristics of the arrest offense) is generally at the 
discretion of the prosecuting attorney.268 One concern is that there may exist 
racial biases at this stage, a fact that would complicate the interpretation of 
racial disparities in the ensuing plea-bargaining process.269 For example, it 
could be that prosecutors “over-charge” black defendants relative to white 
defendants—that is, for a given arrest offense, black defendants are charged 
with more serious crimes than white defendants.270 If this is the case, then 
the magnitude of racial disparities in plea-bargaining documented in the 
Article underestimates actual racial disparities.271 
More problematic is the possibility that prosecutors “over-charge” 
white defendants relative to black defendants. If this is the case, then the 
racial disparities in plea-bargaining (favoring white defendants) document-
ed above would merely be correcting (i.e., reversing) racial disparities in the 
preceding initial charging process (which favored black defendants). The 
data lacks the variables necessary to estimate the existence and magnitude 
of such racial disparities in initial charging (this would require, for example, 
arrest data at the individual level). Nevertheless, examining general patterns 
in the initial charges faced by black and white defendants reassures us that it 
is unlikely that white defendants are being initially “overcharged” by prose-
cuting attorneys.272 
Of the 48,357 observations in the final dataset, 25,629 (or 55.07%) in-
volve white defendants whereas 18,471 (or 38.2%) involve black defend-
ants. This 16.87% difference appears large but says little by itself. One way 
to provide context to these figures is to look at the demographic characteris-
                                                                                                                           
 268 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 269 To complicate matters further, prosecutors’ initial charging decisions may be influenced 
by decisions made by police officers at the initial booking stage. See, e.g., OWENS ET AL., supra 
note 62, at 2, 7 (arguing that racial disparities in sentencing are explained by differences at the 
initial booking stage, wherein black defendants are booked for more severe charges than white 
defendants, and not by disparate plea-bargaining outcomes). 
 270 Existing empirical evidence suggests that this may in fact be the case. See supra note 60 
and accompanying text. 
 271 In other words, a white defendant would be more likely to receive a charge reduction than 
a similar black defendant who committed the same offense even though the white defendant was 
initially charged with a less serious crime than the black defendant. 
 272 In addition, existing empirical evidence from other jurisdictions suggests that this is un-
likely to be the case. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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tics of Dane County. In the 2010 census, 84.7% of the population was cate-
gorized as white, with black individuals making up 5.2% of the popula-
tion.273 Black individuals thus appear to be overrepresented in this universe 
of individuals charged with a crime—their share of the population in the 
database is over seven times their share of the general population in the 
county.274 
Looking at the distribution of black and white defendants in felony and 
misdemeanor cases provides additional context. Of the 15,729 cases with at 
least an initial felony charge, 51.43% involve white defendants whereas 
41.51% involve black defendants, a difference of 9.92%. Of the 32,627 
misdemeanor cases, 56.82% involve white defendants whereas 36.6% in-
volve black defendants, a difference of 20.22%.275 Thus, the population of 
individuals charged with a misdemeanor or felony crime, black individuals 
appear to be significantly overrepresented in the felony subset relative to 
white defendants.276 
CONCLUSION 
The results presented in this Article document the existence of racial 
disparities in the plea-bargaining stage of the criminal justice process. 
White defendants are more likely than black defendants to receive a reduc-
tion in their principal initial charge.277 As a result, white defendants who 
face initial felony charges are more likely than black defendants to end up 
being convicted of misdemeanors rather than more serious crimes.278 Simi-
larly, white defendants initially charged with misdemeanors are more likely 
than black defendants to be convicted for crimes carrying no possible incar-
ceration or not being convicted at all.279 These disparities in plea-bargaining 
appear to be driven by cases in which defendants have no prior convic-
                                                                                                                           
 273 See Quick Facts—Dane County, Wisconsin: 2010 Demographic Profile, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/ (search in Community Facts search bar for “Dane County, 
Wisconsin”; then follow “2010 Demographic Profile” hyperlink). 
 274 To the extent that some of the black defendants prosecuted in Dane County reside else-
where, this metric may overestimate the relative representation of black individuals in the sample. 
 275 Another way of looking at this particular disparity is to consider the proportion of defend-
ants who are initially charged with a felony. For white defendants this rate is 30.38%, while for 
black defendants the rate is 35.35%. The difference between these rates—4.97%—is statistically 
significant. That is, black defendants are 16.36% more likely than white defendants to be charged 
initially with at least one felony. 
 276 In addition, in these felony cases, the average statutory maximum sentence for the princi-
pal charge in cases involving black defendants is 147 months, 13% higher than that of cases in-
volving white defendants, 130 months. 
 277 See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. 
 278 See supra notes 187–190 and accompanying text. 
 279 See supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. 
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tions280 and cases which involve less serious offenses.281 These patterns 
suggest that in “low information” cases, a defendant’s race may be used as a 
proxy for their likelihood to recidivate and latent criminality.282 
These results inform the evaluation of various current policy debates. 
Efforts to mitigate racial disparities in sentencing and incarceration rates 
should consider disparities in the plea-bargaining process and initial charg-
ing decisions. Proposals aimed at restricting prosecutorial discretion by in-
creasing judicial discretion, for example via the elimination of statutory 
minimum sentences, would seem to remedy these disparities.283 The results 
presented in this Article also highlight how racial disparities might run 
deeper in misdemeanor cases, adding an empirical dimension to the con-
cerns of those scholars who have called for the decriminalization of misde-
meanors and for increased scrutiny of the misdemeanor adjudication pro-
cess.284 More generally, the possible implicit nature of the biases driving 
these racial disparities lends support to those who have argued that the 
weight afforded to evidence showing disparate impact in equal protection 
claims should be re-examined.285 
The results and conclusions presented in this Article are subject to 
some caveats. As with most empirical work in this area, it is difficult to es-
tablish a causal link between a defendant’s race and a criminal case out-
come (in this case, charge reductions). One concern is that the models esti-
mated above may not be accounting for certain crime and defendant charac-
teristics that play a role in determining plea-bargaining outcomes and that 
are also correlated with the race of the defendant.286 Failing to control for 
such unobservable variables could be skewing the results.287 One variable 
for which the earlier analyses do not control is whether a defendant was 
                                                                                                                           
 280 See supra notes 197–208 and accompanying text. 
 281 See supra notes 192–194 and accompanying text. 
 282 See supra notes 262–267 and accompanying text. 
 283 See, e.g., Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 46, at 757–61; Rehavi & Starr, supra 
note 48, at 1349–51; Berman & Protass, supra note 159, at A17. 
 284 See supra notes 177–186 and accompanying text. 
 285 See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 286 See, e.g., supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 287 For example, consider two male individuals, one white and one black, of similar age and 
with no prior criminal history, who are separately charged with first degree assault. If the black 
defendant committed the assault in a more heinous manner than the white defendant (a fact ob-
servable to the prosecutor, but unobservable to the researcher), it would not be surprising to ob-
serve that the white defendant received a charge reduction while the black defendant did not. 
However, for such unobservable variable to account for the results presented in this Article one 
would need such variable (e.g., committing a given crime in a more heinous manner) to be sys-
tematically correlated with defendants’ race. 
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granted bail.288 If black defendants in the sample are less likely to be grant-
ed bail than white defendants,289 then some of the observed racial disparities 
in charge reduction rates could be attributed to the fact that defendants fac-
ing pre-trial detention are more likely to plead guilty to their initial top 
charge.290 Similarly, it could be that prosecutors are relying on defendant 
characteristics other than race—but that are correlated with race—to assess 
the risk posed by a defendant.291 More generally, one must consider the pos-
sibility that the results are driven not by prosecutors showing more mercy 
for white defendants, but by defense attorneys being less zealous (whether 
consciously or subconsciously) in their representation of black defend-
ants.292 Finally, the dataset includes cases from 2000–2006 and the results 
may not necessarily be representative of Dane County’s current criminal 
justice process.293 In 2010, the Wisconsin governor appointed Dane Coun-
ty’s first African American district attorney.294 And starting in 2016, Dane 
                                                                                                                           
 288 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2493 (2004) (arguing that pre-trial detention “hampers a defendant’s ability to mount a 
defense,” thus “plac[ing] a high premium on quick plea bargains in small cases”). 
 289 See Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22 
JUST. Q. 170, 181–83 (2005) (finding that black defendants are 25% more likely to be denied bail 
than white defendants and that black defendants are 87% more likely than white defendants to be 
incarcerated prior to trial). Such disparities in bail determinations are not necessarily reflecting the 
risk posed by individual defendants. See David Arnold et al., Racial Bias in Bail Decisions 23 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 23421, 2017) (finding that “marginally released white 
defendants are 19.8 percentage points more likely to be rearrested prior to disposition than mar-
ginally released black defendants . . . , consistent with racial bias against blacks”). 
 290 See Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case 
Outcomes 17–18 (Jan. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777615 
[http://perma.cc/UV42-EW5S] (finding that pre-trial detention is associated with a 13% increase 
in the likelihood of being convicted, due mostly to increased guilty pleas by defendants). 
 291 A defendant’s socio-economic status (e.g., income or education) could be one such charac-
teristic. However, the fact that we observe racial disparities even after controlling for the identity 
of the defense attorney (arguably a proxy for a defendant’s socio-economic status) reassures us 
that this particular omitted variable is not driving the results. See supra notes 246–259 and accom-
panying text. 
 292 See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender 
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2636 (2013) (arguing that implicit biases can affect how public de-
fenders evaluate evidence relating to a defendant based on the defendant’s race, “potentially caus-
ing [a public defender] to unintentionally interpret information as more probative of guilt”); Molly 
J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias and the Rush to the Plea, 65 KAN. L. REV. 271, 283 
(2016) (“Differences in socio-economic background, education, and race can influence even dili-
gent defense attorneys powerfully, and without the attorney being conscious of them.”). 
 293 See supra notes 165–195 and accompanying text. 
 294 On 2010, the Wisconsin governor appointed Ismael Ozanne as Dane County’s district attor-
ney. Mr. Ozanne, who was subsequently elected and re-elected in 2012 and 2016, has implemented 
internal policies seeking to address racial discrimination. See Ed Treleven, Ismael Ozanne Re-elected 
as DA over Prosecutor Bob Jambois, WIS. ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/
news/local/govt-and-politics/ismael-ozanne-re-elected-as-da-over-prosecutor-bob-jambois/article_
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County has provided implicit bias training for judges, prosecutors and pub-
lic defenders.295 It will be interesting to see whether recent changes in poli-
cies and personnel training have been effective in addressing the disparities 
documented earlier. 
Setting these caveats aside, there is no reason why the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and the plea-bargaining process should not be sub-
ject to the same rigorous empirical scrutiny that has been applied to judicial 
decision making and the sentencing process. It would be interesting to see 
whether the patterns in racial disparities documented in this Article are rep-
licated in other jurisdictions. Empirical work should also examine more 
closely any disparities in plea-bargaining outcomes along gender lines and 
explore the intersection of gender and race in this regard.296 Future work can 
also focus more closely on the role of the prosecutor by examining, for ex-
ample, which attributes and characteristics of prosecuting attorneys (if any) 
explain differences in plea-bargaining outcomes297 or documenting the ex-
                                                                                                                           
7b015c97-1a1b-53e0-b0fd-b65428a8e203.html [https://perma.cc/26LN-RH6H]; Ed Treleven, 
Race for Dane DA Has Experienced Underling Sniping at the Incumbent, WIS. ST. J. (Aug. 9, 
2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/race-for-dane-da-has-experienced-
underling-sniping-at-the/article_649d917e-953c-57e6-bc24-fb85c7f913d2.html [https://perma.cc/
C3RP-TKJL]. 
 295 Dane County recently adopted a number of recommendations made by workgroups charged 
with evaluating policies to improve the criminal justice system. Among these recommendations was 
the implementation of an ongoing “Implicit Bias, Equity and Inclusion, Diversity and Poverty train-
ing” for judges, prosecutors and public defenders, among others. See DANE CTY. BD. SUPERVISORS, 
INVESTIGATING SOLUTIONS TO RACIAL DISPARITIES AND MENTAL HEALTH CHALLENGES IN THE 
DANE COUNTY JAIL AND THROUGHOUT DANE COUNTY’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: WORK
GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (Sept. 2015). These implicit bias trainings are already taking place. 
See Chris Rochester & Tyler Brandt, Dane County Spends $50,000 to Send Courthouse Staff to “Im-
plicit Bias” Training, MACIVER INST. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.maciverinstitute.com/2016/
08/dane-county-spends-50000-to-send-courthouse-staff-to-implicit-bias-training/ [https://perma.cc/
2MXB-SQRB]. 
 296 For a summary of studies that have documented gender disparities in sentencing outcomes 
see supra note 40 and accompanying text. Recent studies have examined gender disparities in the 
pre-sentencing stages of federal criminal cases. See, e.g., Shermer & Johnson, supra note 48, at 
413–15 (examining differences in charge reductions); Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Dispari-
ties in Federal Criminal Cases, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 127, 154 (2015) (stressing the “im-
portance of pre-sentencing stages in shaping sentence disparities”). In a separate study I document 
gender disparities in plea bargaining using the same dataset employed in this Article. See Carlos 
Berdejo, Gender Disparities in Plea Bargaining, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019). 
 297 Studies analyzing differences in judges’ sentencing behavior based on judges’ 
demographic characteristics have been inconclusive. While some of these studies have found 
differences between male and female judges and between minority and white judges, other studies 
have found that the race and gender of judges have little influence on their sentencing behavior. 
See Abrams et al., supra note 36 at 372–74 (finding that black judges are associated with longer 
sentences but lower incarceration rates); Claire S.H. Lim et al., Do Judges’ Characteristics Mat-
ter? Ethnicity, Gender, and Partisanship in Texas State Trial Courts, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
302, 305 (2016) (finding that demographic characteristics of judges have little effect on sentence 
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istence of significant heterogeneity across individual prosecuting attor-
neys.298 
Conducting this type of empirical work requires detailed data that pro-
vides information on pre-sentencing decisions made by prosecutors. One of 
the reasons why so much empirical work has focused on judges’ sentencing 
decisions is the fact that public entities at the state and federal levels collect 
and maintain comprehensive data on sentencing.299 There needs to be a sim-
ilar level of transparency with respect to decisions taken by actors in the 
pre-sentencing stages of the criminal justice process. Collecting and main-
taining such data certainly presents a more complex and challenging en-
deavor than collecting data on sentencing decisions, both in terms of the 
number of observations and variables. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin Circuit 
Courts’ CCAP shows that this can be achieved.300 And a number of district 
attorney offices across the nation have tried to collect and use data to inter-
nally identify and address instances of racial bias in the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion.301 The availability of this type of information would also 
allow courts and other external groups to scrutinize prosecutorial decision-
making, an area that traditionally has been less open to the public than sen-
tencing.302 Decision-makers exercising discretion in a transparent criminal 
                                                                                                                           
length); Schanzenbach, supra note 35, at 73 (documenting similar findings); Darrell Steffensmeier 
& Chester L. Britt, Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Dif-
ferently?, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 749, 757–58 (2001) (finding that black judges are more likely to incar-
cerate offenders than white judges); Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Poli-
cymakers: Does the Judge’s Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. 
FORCES 1163, 1174–75 (1999) (finding that female judges are more likely to incarcerate offenders 
and sentence the imprisoned to slightly longer sentences than male judges). 
 298 Recent studies on judges’ sentencing behavior have focused on individual judges, finding 
substantial heterogeneity in average incarceration rates and sentencing length across judges. See 
Abrams et al., supra note 36, at 367–68 (finding that judges’ decisions show significant heteroge-
neity in all sentencing measures, including incarceration, average sentence length, and average 
sentence length conditional on receiving a nonzero jail sentence); Lim et al., supra note 297, at 
305 (finding substantial heterogeneity in sentencing harshness across judges). 
 299 See supra notes 58, 68 and accompanying text. 
 300 See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text. 
 301 See WAYNE MCKENZIE ET AL., VERA INST. JUST., PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE: 
USING DATA TO ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 7 (Mar. 2009), https://www.
vera.org/publications/prosecution-and-racial-justice-using-data-to-advance-fairness-in-criminal-
prosecution (follow “PDF” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/42QN-T9AV]. 
 302 See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 64, at 1 (“While prosecutorial discretion is often 
guided by internal policies, external regulation or oversight of this discretion is quite limited.”); 
MCKENZIE ET AL., supra note 301, at 1 (“Unlike officials in law enforcement and the judiciary, 
who have come under varying degrees of oversight in recent years, prosecutors act with little out-
side scrutiny or governance.”). 
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justice process can be held accountable and this accountability can help le-
gitimize the system in the eyes of all citizens.303 
  
                                                                                                                           
 303 See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 64, at 9 (“Prosecutors, as powerful actors in the 
criminal justice system, are empowered to adopt measures that promise to significantly promote 
equity for all people throughout all stages of the criminal justice continuum. Doing so will require 
a commitment to accountability and transparency.”). 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table 1—Description of Main Explanatory Variables304 
Black Indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant was African American. 
Other 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant was not African American or Cau-
casian. 
Female Indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant was a woman. 
Age 
Equal to the age of the defendant as of the initial filing and calculated as the year 
of the case filing minus the defendant’s year of birth.  
Prior (1) Indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant had one prior conviction. 
Prior (2+) Indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant had two or more prior convictions. 
ConcCov 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant was convicted of at least two charges. In 
specifications restricted to felonies, it is equal to 1 if there are at least two felony 
convictions. In specifications restricted to misdemeanors, it’s equal to 1 if there are 
at least two misdemeanor convictions. 
ConcChrg 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant was initially charged with at least two 
crimes. In specifications restricted to felonies, it is equal to 1 if there are at least 
two felony charges. In specifications restricted to misdemeanors, it’s equal to 1 if 
there are at least two misdemeanor charges. 
Trial 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if any of the charges in a case was adjudicated in a 
trial. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 304 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 2—Crime Type Categories305 
Bail Jumping (Wis. Stat. § 946.49) 
 
Other Drug Offenses (Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(4), .42-
.65) 
Battery - Special (Wis. Stat. §§ 940.201, 203) Other Felony 
Battery (Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19-20) 
 
Other Misdemeanor 
Burglary (Wis. Stat. § 943.10) 
 
OWI/PAC (Wis. Stat. § 346.63) 
Child Abuse (Wis. Stat. § 948.03) 
 
OWI/PAC w/Child (Wis. Stat. § 346.63) 
Child Neglect/Fail to Support (Wis. Stat. §§ 948.21-23) Receiving Stolen Property (Wis. Stat. § 943.34) 
Crimes Against Animals (Wis. Stat. § § 951) 
Reckless/Negligent Injuries (Wis. Stat. §§ 940.23-
.24) 
Criminal Damage to Property (Wis. Stat. § 943.01) Resisting Arrest (Wis. Stat. § 946.41) 
Disorderly Conduct (Wis. Stat. § 947.01) Robbery (Wis. Stat. § 943.32) 
Drug Manufacture/Deliver (Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)) Sex Crimes (Wis. Stat. §§ 944.15-.32) 
Drug Possession (Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)) Sex Registry Violation (Wis. Stat. § 301.45) 
Drug Possession w/ Intent (Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m), (2)) 
Sexual Assault Child - Repeated (Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025) 
Endangering Safety (Wis. Stat. § 941.30) Sexual Assault Child (Wis. Stat. § 948.02) 
Escape (Wis. Stat. § 946.42) 
 
Sexual Assault (Wis. Stat. § 940.225) 
Fail to Report to Jail (Wis. Stat. § 946.425) Stalking (Wis. Stat. § 940.32) 
Fleeing Officer (Wis. Stat. § 346.04) Theft - Credit Card (Wis. Stat. § 943.41) 
Forgery/Fraudulent Writing (Wis. Stat. §§ 943.37-40) Theft - Identity (Wis. Stat. §§ 943.201-.203) 
Fraud on Merchants (Non-Retail) (Wis. Stat. § 943.21) Theft - Retail (Wis. Stat. § 943.50) 
Hit and Run (Wis. Stat. §§ 346.67-.69) Theft (Wis. Stat. § 943.20) 
Homicide (Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01-.10) 
Threats to Injure/Accuse of Crime (Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.30) 
Injury by use of Vehicle (Wis. Stat. § 940.25) Threats/Harassment (Wis. Stat. §§ 947.012-.013) 
Intimidate Witness/Victim (Wis. Stat. §§ 940.42-.45) Trespass (Wis. Stat. §§ 943.125-.145) 
Kidnap/Hostage (Wis. Stat. §§ 940.30-.31) Violation of TRO (Wis. Stat. §§ 813.12 - .128) 
Operate Vehicle w/out Consent (Wis. Stat. § 943.23) Weapons/Explosives (Wis. Stat. §§ 941.20-.315) 
Other Crimes Against Children (Wis. Stat. §§ 948.07-.13) Worthless Checks (Wis. Stat. § 943.24) 
Other Crimes Against Children (Wis. Stat. §§ 948.30-.62) 
  
                                                                                                                           
 305 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Table 3—Charge Reduction Rates & Crime Severity  
(with Alternative Crime Controls)306 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Cases Misd. Cases 
Felony Cases 
 
All Low High 
      
Black -0.068*** -0.082*** -0.043*** -0.111*** -0.021** 
 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.018] [0.010] 
Other -0.034*** -0.045*** -0.006 -0.037 0.005 
 
[0.010] [0.012] [0.019] [0.039] [0.022] 
Female 0.060*** 0.076*** 0.020* 0.0128 0.022* 
 
[0.006] [0.008] [0.011] [0.025] [0.013] 
Age 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.002* -0.000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Prior (1) -0.242*** -0.267*** -0.164*** -0.174*** -0.160*** 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.012] [0.023] [0.014] 
Prior (2+) -0.328*** -0.352*** -0.251*** -0.297*** -0.235*** 
 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.010] [0.018] [0.011] 
ConcChrg -0.078 0.0154** 0.116*** 0.206*** 0.104*** 
 
[0.054] [0.007] [0.010] [0.025] [0.010] 
      Obs. 47,434 30,439 16,984 4,233 12,751 
Mean 0.417 0.397 0.454 0.451 0.455 
  
                                                                                                                           
 306 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: 
Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%). This table presents the marginal effects from probit models in which the outcome variable is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the initial top charge in a case was dropped, amended to a lesser 
charge or dismissed. Column (1) includes all cases, column (2) includes all misdemeanor cases 
and column (3) include all felony cases. Columns (4) and (5) divide felony cases based on whether 
the principal charge carried a potential sentence of (i) 5 years or less or (ii) more than 5 years, 
respectively. For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see infra note 304 and ac-
companying text (Appendix 1: Table 1). All regressions include a set of year fixed effects and 
crime class-type interaction fixed effects (see supra note 213). 
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APPENDIX 4 
Table 4—Charge Reduction Rates & Criminal History  
(with Alternative Crime Controls)307 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
All Cases Misdemeanor Cases Felony Cases 
 
No Prior Prior No Prior Prior No Prior Prior 
       
Black -0.147*** -0.019*** -0.164*** -0.023*** -0.115*** -0.013 
 
[0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.016] [0.010] 
Other -0.024* -0.061*** -0.034** -0.075*** 0.006 -0.022 
 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.016] [0.014] [0.027] [0.025] 
Female 0.093*** 0.016* 0.107*** 0.024*** 0.047*** -0.002 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.017] [0.014] 
Age 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*** -0.000 0.001 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Prior (2+) 
 
-0.073*** 
 
-0.063*** 
 
-0.087*** 
  
[0.007] 
 
[0.008] 
 
[0.012] 
ConcChrg -0.060 -0.071 -0.058*** -0.023*** -0.158*** -0.090*** 
 
[0.112] [0.055] [0.011] [0.008] [0.017] [0.011] 
       
Obs. 18,730 28,610 13,166 17,264 5,558 11,342 
Mean 0.597 0.299 0.595 0.247 0.603 0.379 
                                                                                                                           
 307 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/
law-review-content/BCLR/59-4/berdejo-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-GP79]. Note: Robust 
standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). This 
table presents the marginal effects from the series of probit models described next. The outcome 
variable in columns (1)–(6) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the initial top charge in a case was 
dropped, amended to a lesser charge or dismissed. Columns (1)–(2) includes all cases, while col-
umns (3)–(4) and (5)–(6) include all misdemeanor and felony cases, respectively. Columns (1), (3) 
and (5) restrict the sample to cases in which the defendant had no prior convictions. Columns (2), 
(4) and (6) restrict the sample to cases in which the defendant had at least one prior conviction. 
For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see infra note 304 and accompanying text 
(Appendix 1: Table 1). All regressions include a set of year fixed effects and crime class-type 
interaction fixed effects (see supra note 213). 
  
 
